PHENOMENAL CONSERVATISM, JUSTIFICATION, AND SELF-DEFEAT (pages 103–110)

Submitted by logos on Mon, 03/31/2014 - 17:21
paper title: 

PHENOMENAL CONSERVATISM, JUSTIFICATION, AND SELF-DEFEAT (pages 103–110)

paper type: 
debate
paper author: 

Moti MIZRAHI

paper author family name: 

MIZRAHI

paper abstract: 

ABSTRACT: In this paper, I argue that Phenomenal Conservatism (PC) is not superior to alternative theories of basic propositional justification insofar as those theories that reject PC are self-defeating. I show that self-defeat arguments similar to Michael Huemer’s Self-Defeat Argument for PC can be constructed for other theories of basic propositional justification as well. If this is correct, then there is nothing special about PC in that respect. In other words, if self-defeat arguments can be advanced in support of alternatives to PC, then Huemer’s Self-Defeat argument doesn’t uniquely motivate PC. 

paper issue: 
15

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