AN ARGUMENT AGAINST THE POSSIBILITY OF GETTIERED BELIEFS (pages 265-272)

Submitted by logos on Tue, 09/30/2014 - 07:32
paper title: 

AN ARGUMENT AGAINST THE POSSIBILITY OF GETTIERED BELIEFS (pages 265-272)

paper type: 
article
paper author: 

Benoit GAULTIER

paper author family name: 

GAULTIER

paper abstract: 

ABSTRACT: In this paper, I propose a new argument against Gettier’s counterexamples to the thesis that knowledge is justified true belief. I claim that if there is no doxastic voluntarism, and if it is admitted that one has formed the belief that p at t1 if, at t0, one would be surprised to learn or discover that not-p, it can be plausibly argued that Gettiered beliefs simply cannot be formed.

paper issue: 
17

Powered by Drupal 6 | web development: Codrin Dinu Vasiliu

Powered by Drupal, an open source content management system
© 2010 Logos & Episteme | An International Journal of Epistemology. Drupal theme by Kiwi Themes.