LOTTERIES, KNOWLEDGE, AND PRACTICAL REASONING (pages 225-231)

Submitted by logos on Tue, 06/28/2011 - 16:39
paper title: 

LOTTERIES, KNOWLEDGE, AND PRACTICAL REASONING (pages 225-231)

paper type: 
article
paper author: 

Rachel R. McKINNON

paper author family name: 

MCKINNON

paper abstract: 

ABSTRACT: This paper addresses an argument offered by John Hawthorne against the propriety of an agent’s using propositions she does not know as premises in practical reasoning. I will argue that there are a number of potential structural confounds in Hawthorne’s use of his main example, a case of practical reasoning about a lottery. By drawing these confounds out more explicitly, we can get a better sense of how to make appropriate use of such examples in theorizing about norms, knowledge, and practical reasoning. I will conclude by suggesting a prescription for properly using lottery propositions to do the sort of work that Hawthorne wants from them.

paper issue: 
4

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