pragmatic encroachment

paper title: 

NOT-EXACT-TRUTHS, PRAGMATIC ENCROACHMENT AND THE EPISTEMIC NORM OF PRACTICAL REASONING (pages 239-259)

paper type: 
article
paper author: 

Michael J. SHAFFER

paper author family name: 

SHAFFER

paper abstract: 

ABSTRACT: Recently a number of variously motivated epistemologists have argued that knowledge is closely tied to practical matters. On the one hand, radical pragmatic encroachment is the view that facts about whether an agent has knowledge depend on practical factors and this is coupled to the view that there is an important connection between knowledge and action. On the other hand, one can argue for the less radical thesis only that there is an important connection between knowledge and practical reasoning. So, defenders of both of these views endorse the view that knowledge is the norm of practical reasoning. This thesis has recently come under heavy fire and a number of weaker proposals have been defended. In this paper counter-examples to the knowledge norm of reasoning will be presented and it will be argued that this view – and a number of related but weaker views – cannot be sustained in the face of these counter-examples. The paper concludes with a novel proposal concerning the norm of practical reasoning that is immune to the counter-examples introduced here.

paper issue: 
8

INFINITISM AND PRACTICAL CONDITIONS ON JUSTIFICATION (pages 191-209)

Submitted by logos on Tue, 06/28/2011 - 16:35
paper title: 

INFINITISM AND PRACTICAL CONDITIONS ON JUSTIFICATION (pages 191-209)

paper type: 
article
paper author: 

Jeremy FANTL

paper author family name: 

FANTL

paper abstract: 

ABSTRACT: This paper brings together two recent developments in the theory of epistemic justification: practical conditions on justification, and infinitism (the view that justification is a matter of having an infinite series of non-repeating reasons). Pragmatic principles can be used to argue that, if we’re looking for an ‘objective’ theory of the structure of justification – a theory that applies to all subjects independently of their practical context – infinitism stands the only chance at being the correct theory.

paper issue: 
4

AGAINST PRAGMATIC ENCROACHMENT (pages 77-85)

Submitted by logos on Mon, 03/28/2011 - 10:10
paper title: 

AGAINST PRAGMATIC ENCROACHMENT (pages 77-85)

paper type: 
article
paper author: 

Jonathan L. KVANVIG

paper author family name: 

KVANVIG

paper abstract: 

ABSTRACT: Anti-intellectualist theories of knowledge claim that in some way or other, practical stakes are involved in whether knowledge is present (or, where the view is contextualist, whether sentences about knowledge are true in a given context). Interest in pragmatic encroachment arose with the development of contextualist theories concerning knowledge ascriptions.  In these cases, there is an initial situation in which hardly anything is at stake, and knowledge is easily ascribed.  The subsequent situation is one where the costs of being wrong are fairly significant from a practical point of view, and the claim made by pragmatic encroachers is that knowledge should not be ascribed in such situations and typically is not by competent speakers. My goal here is to show how mistaken the idea of pragmatic encroachment is.

paper issue: 
3

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