contextualism

paper title: 

THE PERSISTENT PROBLEM OF THE LOTTERY PARADOX: AND ITS UNWELCOME CONSEQUENCES FOR CONTEXTUALISM (pages 85–100)

paper type: 
article
paper author: 

Travis TIMMERMAN

paper author family name: 

TIMMERMAN

paper abstract: 

ABSTRACT: This paper attempts to show that contextualism cannot adequately handle all versions of ‘The Lottery Paradox.” Although the application of contextualist rules is meant to vindicate the intuitive distinction between cases of knowledge and non-knowledge, it fails to do so when applied to certain versions of “The Lottery Paradox.” In making my argument, I first briefly explain why this issue should be of central importance for contextualism. I then review Lewis’ contextualism before offering my argument that the lottery paradox persists on all contextualist accounts. Although I argue that the contextualist does not fare well, hope nevertheless remains. For, on Lewis’ behalf, I offer what I take to be the best solution for the contextualist and argue that once this solution is adopted, contextualism will be in a better position to handle the lottery paradox than any other substantive epistemological theory. 

paper issue: 
11

AGAINST PRAGMATIC ENCROACHMENT (pages 77-85)

Submitted by logos on Mon, 03/28/2011 - 10:10
paper title: 

AGAINST PRAGMATIC ENCROACHMENT (pages 77-85)

paper type: 
article
paper author: 

Jonathan L. KVANVIG

paper author family name: 

KVANVIG

paper abstract: 

ABSTRACT: Anti-intellectualist theories of knowledge claim that in some way or other, practical stakes are involved in whether knowledge is present (or, where the view is contextualist, whether sentences about knowledge are true in a given context). Interest in pragmatic encroachment arose with the development of contextualist theories concerning knowledge ascriptions.  In these cases, there is an initial situation in which hardly anything is at stake, and knowledge is easily ascribed.  The subsequent situation is one where the costs of being wrong are fairly significant from a practical point of view, and the claim made by pragmatic encroachers is that knowledge should not be ascribed in such situations and typically is not by competent speakers. My goal here is to show how mistaken the idea of pragmatic encroachment is.

paper issue: 
3

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