Epistemology

EXTERNALISM, SKEPTICISM, AND BELIEF (pages 275-301)

Submitted by logos on Tue, 09/30/2014 - 07:34
paper title: 

EXTERNALISM, SKEPTICISM, AND BELIEF (pages 275-301)

paper type: 
article
paper author: 

Michael Shaw PERRY

paper author family name: 

PERRY

paper abstract: 

ABSTRACT: In this paper I analyze epistemological externalism and its adequacy as a response to skepticism. Externalism is defined by denial of accessibility: a subject can know if a particular condition beyond truth and belief is satisfied, even if the subject has no reflective access to the satisfaction of the condition. It hence has quick responses to skepticism. Three sorts of skepticism are differentiated and discussed: high standards skepticism, Cartesian-style skepticism, and Pyrrhonism. If we decouple high standards and Cartesian-style skepticism, a simple fallibilism is a superior response to the first and externalism is an unsatisfying response to the second. Pyrrhonism reveals what it is missing in externalism. Pyrrhonism targets belief and so redefinitions of knowledge are insufficient as a reply. Externalism assumes we have beliefs and asks what must be added to achieve knowledge, but if we look at the epistemic situation the externalist puts us in, it is not clear we would form or retain beliefs. In similar circumstances the Pyrrhonist suspends judgment. Once we are clear how Pyrrhonism actually challenges externalism it provides a direct and more revealing critique, making clear what is given up and pointing the way for further epistemological inquiry.      

paper issue: 
17
paper title: 

MAXWELLIAN SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTION: A CASE STUDY IN KANTIAN EPISTEMOLOGY (pages 183–207)

paper type: 
article
paper author: 

Rinat M. NUGAYEV

paper author family name: 

NUGAYEV

paper abstract: 

ABSTRACT: It is exhibited that maxwellian electrodynamics was created as a result of the old pre-maxwellian programmes reconciliation: the electrodynamics of Ampere-Weber, the wave theory of Young-Fresnel and Faraday’s programme. The programmes’ meeting led to construction of the whole hierarchy of theoretical objects starting from the genuine crossbreeds (the displacement current) and up to usual mongrels. After the displacement current construction the interpenetration of the pre-maxwellian programmes began that marked the beginning of theoretical schemes of optics and electromagnetism real unification. Maxwell’s programme did supersede its rivals because it did assimilate some ideas of the Ampere-Weber programme, as well as the presuppositions of the programmes of Young-Fresnel and Faraday. Maxwellian programme’s victory over its rivals became possible because the core of Maxwell’s unification strategy was formed by Kantian epistemology looked through the prism of William Whewell and such representatives of Scottish Enlightenment as Thomas Reid and William Hamilton.It was Kantian epistemology that enabled Hermann von Helmholtz and his pupil Heinrich Hertz to arrive at such a version of Maxwell’s theory that could serve a heuristical basis for the radio waves discovery. 

paper issue: 
16

EPISTEMIC INTERNALISM, JUSTIFICATION, AND MEMORY (pages 33–62)

Submitted by logos on Mon, 03/31/2014 - 17:16
paper title: 

EPISTEMIC INTERNALISM, JUSTIFICATION, AND MEMORY (pages 33–62)

paper type: 
article
paper author: 

B.J.C. Madison

paper author family name: 

Madison

paper abstract: 

ABSTRACT: Epistemic internalism, by stressing the indispensability of the subject’s perspective, strikes many as plausible at first blush. However, many people have tended to reject the position because certain kinds of beliefs have been thought to pose special problems for epistemic internalism. For example, internalists tend to hold that so long as a justifier is available to the subject either immediately or upon introspection, it can serve to justify beliefs. Many have thought it obvious that no such view can be correct, as it has been alleged that internalism cannot account for the possibility of the justification of beliefs stored in memory. My aim in this paper is to offer a response that explains how memory justification is possible in a way that is consistent with epistemic internalism and an awareness condition on justification. Specifically, I will explore the plausibility of various options open to internalists, including both foundationalist and non-foundationalist approaches to the structure of justification. I intend to show that despite other difficult challenges that epistemic internalism might face, memory belief poses no special problems that the resources of internalism cannot adequately address. 

paper issue: 
15
paper title: 

THE PERSISTENT PROBLEM OF THE LOTTERY PARADOX: AND ITS UNWELCOME CONSEQUENCES FOR CONTEXTUALISM (pages 85–100)

paper type: 
article
paper author: 

Travis TIMMERMAN

paper author family name: 

TIMMERMAN

paper abstract: 

ABSTRACT: This paper attempts to show that contextualism cannot adequately handle all versions of ‘The Lottery Paradox.” Although the application of contextualist rules is meant to vindicate the intuitive distinction between cases of knowledge and non-knowledge, it fails to do so when applied to certain versions of “The Lottery Paradox.” In making my argument, I first briefly explain why this issue should be of central importance for contextualism. I then review Lewis’ contextualism before offering my argument that the lottery paradox persists on all contextualist accounts. Although I argue that the contextualist does not fare well, hope nevertheless remains. For, on Lewis’ behalf, I offer what I take to be the best solution for the contextualist and argue that once this solution is adopted, contextualism will be in a better position to handle the lottery paradox than any other substantive epistemological theory. 

paper issue: 
11

EPISTEMIC DISPOSITIONS. REPLY TO TURRI AND BRONNER (pages 629-636)

Submitted by logos on Fri, 12/28/2012 - 10:59
paper title: 

EPISTEMIC DISPOSITIONS. REPLY TO TURRI AND BRONNER (pages 629-636)

paper type: 
debate
paper author: 

Rachael BRIGGS, Daniel NOLAN

paper author family name: 

BRIGGS, NOLAN

paper abstract: 

ABSTRACT: We reply to recent papers by John Turri and Ben Bronner, who criticise the dispositionalised Nozickian tracking account we discuss in “Mad, Bad and Dangerous to Know.” We argue that the account we suggested can handle the problems raised by Turri and Bronner. In the course of responding to Turri and Bronner’s objections, we draw three general lessons for theories of epistemic dispositions: that epistemic dispositions are to some extent extrinsic, that epistemic dispositions can have manifestation conditions concerning circumstances where their bearers fail to exist, and that contrast is relevant to disposition attributions. 

paper issue: 
10
paper title: 

THE CONCILIATORY VIEW AND THE CHARGE OF WHOLESALE SKEPTICISM (pages 619-627)

paper type: 
debate
paper author: 

Christopher BOBIER

paper author family name: 

BOBIER

paper abstract: 

ABSTRACT: If I reasonably think that you and I enjoy the same evidence as well as virtues and vices, then we are epistemic peers. What does rationality require of us should we disagree? According to the conciliatory view, I should become less confident in my belief upon finding out that you, whom I take to be my peer, disagree with me. Question: Does the conciliatory view lead to wholesale skepticism regarding areas of life where disagreement is rampant? After all, people focusing on the same arguments and possessing the same virtues commonly disagree over religion, politics, ethics, philosophy and other areas. David Christensen and Adam Elga have responded that conciliationism does not lead to wholesale skepticism. I argue that Christensen and Elga cannot avoid the charge of wholesale skepticism. But I also argue that if they could avoid skepticism, then the conciliatory view would become irrelevant since it would not inform us as to what rationality requires of us in every-day disagreement. Thus either way the conciliatory view is saddled with unintuitive consequences. 

paper issue: 
10

BEYOND MODES OF OBJECTIVITY (pages 361-371)

Submitted by logos on Sun, 09/30/2012 - 08:07
paper title: 

BEYOND MODES OF OBJECTIVITY (pages 361-371)

paper type: 
article
paper author: 

Robert ALBIN

paper author family name: 

ALBIN

paper abstract: 

ABSTRACT: Frege, and others who followed him, stressed the role of fallibility as a means to defining ‘objectivity.’ By defining objective judgments as fallible, these philosophers contributed to the consolidation of a theory of objectivity which suggested interpreting epistemological, as well as other judgements, as being objective. An important philosophical implication of this theory lies in its disclosure of the interrelations between truth and objectivity. In light of this insight, and based on an analysis of instances of false (epistemological and other) judgments, I show that truth and objectivity go hand-in-hand, while falsity and objectivity do not. This finding alone indicates the necessity to revise the theory of objectivity.

paper issue: 
9

RETHINKING THE A PRIORI/A POSTERIORI DISTINCTION (pages 261-277)

Submitted by logos on Wed, 06/27/2012 - 14:58
paper title: 

RETHINKING THE A PRIORI/A POSTERIORI DISTINCTION (pages 261-277)

paper type: 
article
paper author: 

Jennifer Wilson MULNIX

paper author family name: 

MULNIX

paper abstract: 

ABSTRACT: This paper offers an account of the a priori/a posteriori distinction utilizing the insights of reliabilism, focusing on the inputs to reliable belief-forming processes. I propose that a belief possesses a priori justification if it is the result of a reliable belief-producing process whose input is ‘non-sensory’ and the reliability of this process does not ‘causally depend’ on the reliability of a prior process taking in ‘sensory’ input. One of the interesting consequences of this account is in the treatment of introspective knowledge of one’s belief-states; it was classically considered a posteriori, but comes out a priori on this model. 

paper issue: 
8

IS THERE PROPOSITIONAL UNDERSTANDING? (pages 181-192)

Submitted by logos on Wed, 06/27/2012 - 14:49
paper title: 

IS THERE PROPOSITIONAL UNDERSTANDING? (pages 181-192)

paper type: 
article
paper author: 

Emma C. GORDON

paper author family name: 

GORDON

paper abstract: 

ABSTRACT: Literature in epistemology tends to suppose that there are three main types of understanding – propositional, atomistic, and objectual. By showing that all apparent instances of propositional understanding can be more plausibly explained as featuring one of several other epistemic states, this paper argues that talk of propositional understanding is unhelpful and misleading. The upshot is that epistemologists can do without the notion of propositional understanding. 

paper issue: 
8
paper title: 

AN ARROVIAN IMPOSSIBILITY THEOREM FOR THE EPISTEMOLOGY OF DISAGREEMENT (pages 97-115)

paper type: 
article
paper author: 

Nicholaos JONES

paper author family name: 

JONES

paper abstract: 

ABSTRACT: According to conciliatory views about the epistemology of disagreement, when epistemic peers have conflicting doxastic attitudes toward a proposition and fully disclose to one another the reasons for their attitudes toward that proposition (and neither has independent reason to believe the other to be mistaken), each peer should always change his attitude toward that proposition to one that is closer to the attitudes of those peers with which there is disagreement. According to pure higher-order evidence views, higher-order evidence for a proposition always suffices to determine the proper rational response to disagreement about that proposition within a group of epistemic peers. Using an analogue of Arrow's Impossibility Theorem, I shall argue that no conciliatory and pure higher-order evidence view about the epistemology of disagreement can provide a true and general answer to the question of what disagreeing epistemic peers should do after fully disclosing to each other the (first-order) reasons for their conflicting doxastic attitudes.

paper issue: 
7

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