Epistemology

WHAT IS INTERESTING? (pages 515-542)

Submitted by logos on Tue, 12/27/2011 - 12:31
paper title: 

WHAT IS INTERESTING? (pages 515-542)

paper type: 
article
paper author: 

Stephen GRIMM

paper author family name: 

GRIMM

paper abstract: 

ABSTRACT: In this paper I consider what it is that makes certain topics or questions epistemically interesting. Getting clear about this issue, I argue, is not only interesting in its own right, but also helps to shed light on increasingly important and perplexing questions in the epistemological literature: e.g., questions concerning how to think about ‘the epistemic point of view,’ as well as questions concerning what is most worthy of our intellectual attention and why.

paper issue: 
6
paper title: 

PAUL RICOEUR’S HERMENEUTICS BETWEEN EPISTEMOLOGY AND ONTOLOGY (pages 335-345)

paper type: 
article
paper author: 

Cătălin BOBB

paper author family name: 

BOBB

paper abstract: 

ABSTRACT: The aim of our text is to explore the ties of Ricoeur’s hermeneutics with ontology and epistemology. We have to admit that (1) for Ricoeur, at the beginning of his work, hermeneutics (as one can find it in Le conflit des interprétations) was never a main topic (hermeneutics, as hermeneutic intelligence, was always a solution to a certain problem and never a problem in itself), and (2) that when hermeneutics becomes a main topic (as one can find it in Du texte à l'action), the purpose of Ricoeur is to suggest a renew ontological hermeneutics, beyond Heidegger and Gadamer, but still tied with his non-hermeneutic intents. Our thesis is that Ricoeur’s latest hermeneutics, beyond his epistemological status, can be regarded as ontology. Of course, one cannot find a direct ontology, as we can find it in Heidegger or Gadamer, but one can find what we can call a reversed ontology, an ontology which does not start from the centre of the human experience of understanding but outside of it. In other words, we are going to show that not even his late hermeneutics (the critical moment), better known as textual hermeneutics, is not per se an epistemological hermeneutics beyond its declared intention as being one.

paper issue: 
5

IN DEFENSE OF EPISTEMIC ABSTEMIOUSNESS (pages 287-292)

Submitted by logos on Tue, 06/28/2011 - 16:46
paper title: 

IN DEFENSE OF EPISTEMIC ABSTEMIOUSNESS (pages 287-292)

paper type: 
debate
paper author: 

Alex BUNDY

paper author family name: 

BUNDY

paper abstract: 

ABSTRACT: The principle of suspension says that when you disagree with an epistemic peer about p, you should suspend judgment about p. In “Epistemic Abstainers, Epistemic Martyrs, and Epistemic Converts,” Scott F. Aikin, Michael Harbour, Jonathan Neufeld, and Robert B. Talisse argue against the principle of suspension, claiming that it “is deeply at odds with how we view ourselves as cognitive agents.” I argue that their arguments do not succeed.

paper issue: 
4

Lloyd P. Gerson, Ancient Epistemology (pages 155-156)

Submitted by logos on Mon, 03/28/2011 - 10:19
paper title: 

Lloyd P. Gerson, Ancient Epistemology (pages 155-156)

paper type: 
review
paper author: 

Bogdan BAGHIU

paper author family name: 

BAGHIU

paper abstract: 

Ancient Epistemology is the fifth book of Lloyd P. Gerson, Professor of Philosophy at the University of Toronto, and a well known and appreciated specialist in ancient Greek philosophy (especially Plato and Aristotle). His books on this topic include God and Greek Philosophy (1990), Knowing persons. A Study in Plato (2004) or Aristotle and Other Platonists (2006).

paper issue: 
3

REASONING ABOUT CLOSURE (pages 67-76)

Submitted by logos on Mon, 03/28/2011 - 10:09
paper title: 

REASONING ABOUT CLOSURE (pages 67-76)

paper type: 
article
paper author: 

Bernard D. KATZ, Doris OLIN

paper author family name: 

KATZ, OLIN

paper abstract: 

ABSTRACT: The specter of epistemic closure haunts current epistemology: some regard the refutation of closure as obvious, while others take its denial to be an epistemic outrage. To some extent, the strong difference of opinion has its source in certain misapprehensions. This paper tries to formulate and clarify the key issues dividing the two sides and contends that, in certain respects, the difference between the friend and the foe of closure may be more a matter of semantics than substance. The paper goes on to argue that once the substantial issues have been properly formulated, there is a limit to how far deductive reasoning can take the parties to the dispute.

paper issue: 
3
paper title: 

THE ORIGIN OF THE ‘GETTIER’ PROBLEM: SOCRATES AND THE THEAETETUS (pages 51-66)

paper type: 
article
paper author: 

Michael JENKINS

paper author family name: 

JENKINS

paper abstract: 

ABSTRACT:This article discusses the origin of what has become known as the Gettier Problem. It examines the claim put forward, though not expounded or defended, by J. Angelo Corlett in Analyzing Social Knowledge that the basis for Edmund Gettier’s article “Is Justified True Belief Knowledge?” was originally argued for in Plato’s Theaetetus. In his article, Gettier argues that the Justified True Belief condition is not sufficient for knowledge. However, Corlett questions the originality of this argument. This article examines Gettier’s article followed by the Theatetus. After which, the two articles are compared, and the claim is shown to be correct in accusing Gettier of failing consider the full work of the Theaetetus.  Socrates also argued that the Justified True Belief condition was not sufficient for knowledge. However, this article concludes by arguing that Socrates went further with his examination than Gettier did. Socrates not only put forward the claim that this condition was insufficient for knowledge, he also tried to supply answers to the problem.

paper issue: 
3

TOUCHSTONES OF HISTORY: ANSCOMBE, HUME, AND JULIUS CAESAR (pages 39-58)

Submitted by logos on Tue, 12/28/2010 - 16:18
paper title: 

TOUCHSTONES OF HISTORY: ANSCOMBE, HUME, AND JULIUS CAESAR (pages 39-58)

paper type: 
article
paper author: 

Catherine Z. ELGIN

paper author family name: 

ELGIN

paper abstract: 

ABSTRACT: In “Hume and Julius Caesar,” G.E.M. Anscombe argues that some historical claims, such as “Julius Caesar was assassinated,” serve as touchstones for historical knowledge. Only Cartesian doubt can call them into question. I examine her reasons for thinking that the discipline of history must be grounded in claims that it is powerless to discredit. I argue that she is right to recognize that some historical claims are harder to dislodge than others, but wrong to contend that any are invulnerable to non-Cartesian doubt.

paper issue: 
1
paper title: 

BELIEF IN NATURALISM: AN EPISTEMOLOGIST’S PHILOSOPHY OF MIND (pages 67-84)

paper type: 
article
paper author: 

Susan HAACK

paper author family name: 

HAACK

paper abstract: 

ABSTRACT: My title, “Belief in Naturalism,” signals, not that I adopt naturalism as an article of faith, but that my purpose in this paper is to shed some light on what belief is, on why the concept of belief is needed in epistemology, and how all this relates to debates about epistemological naturalism. After clarifying the many varieties of naturalism, philosophical and other (section 1), and then the various forms of epistemological naturalism specifically (section 2), I offer a theory of belief in which three elements – the behavioral, the neurophysiological, and the socio-historical – interlock (section 3), and apply this theory to resolve some contested questions: about whether animals and pre-linguistic infants have beliefs, about the fallibility of introspection, and about self-deception (section 4).

paper issue: 
1

GETTING GETTIER’D ON TESTIMONY (pages 361-369)

Submitted by logos on Mon, 12/27/2010 - 22:54
paper title: 

GETTING GETTIER’D ON TESTIMONY (pages 361-369)

paper type: 
article
paper author: 

Lauren J. LEYDON-HARDY

paper author family name: 

Leydon

paper abstract: 

ABSTRACT: There are noncontroversial ways in which our words are context dependent. Gradable adjectives like ‘flat’ or ‘bald’, for example. A more controversial proposition is that nouns can be context dependent in a reasonably similar way. If this is true, then it looks like we can develop a positive account of semantic content as sensitive to context. This might be worrying for the epistemology of testimony. That is, how can we garner knowledge from testimony if it’s the case that, though our syntactic utterances are identical, the semantic content of them may fail to be uniform? What if we mean different things by the same words? I argue that these kinds of semantic divergences provide the groundwork for a new kind of Gettier case. That is, given the likelihood of divergent semantic content, we can see a way to scenarios in which, despite that the semantic content is uniform, we might get justified true beliefs that nevertheless fail as knowledge. This, because it just as likely could have been the case that relevant contexts were dissimilar, and thus relevant semantic content would have been divergent. Lastly, where the losophie.hu-berlin.de">MoeckelC@Philosophie.hu-berlin.de.

paper issue: 
2
paper title: 

EPISTEMIC ABSTAINERS, EPISTEMIC MARTYRS, AND EPISTEMIC CONVERTS (pages 211-219)

paper type: 
article
paper author: 

Scott F. AIKIN, Michael HARBOUR, Jonathan NEUFELD, Robert B. TALISSE

paper author family name: 

Aikin

paper abstract: 

ABSTRACT: An intuitive view regarding the epistemic significance of disagreement says that when epistemic peers disagree, they should suspend judgment. This abstemious view seems to embody a kind of detachment appropriate for rational beings; moreover, it seems to promote a kind of conciliatory inclination that makes for irenic and cooperative further discussion. Like many strategies for cooperation, however, the abstemious view creates opportunities for free-riding. In this essay, the authors argue that the believer who suspends judgment in the face of peer disagreement is vulnerable to a kind of manipulation on the part of more tenacious peers. The result is that the abstemious view can have the effect of encouraging dogmatism.

paper issue: 
2

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