lottery paradox

paper title: 

WHAT IS THE PERMISSIBILITY SOLUTION A SOLUTION OF? – A QUESTION FOR KROEDEL (pages 333-342)

paper type: 
debate
paper author: 

Franz HUBER

paper author family name: 

HUBER

paper abstract: 

ABSTRACT: Kroedel has proposed a new solution, the permissibility solution, to the lottery paradox. The lottery paradox results from the Lockean thesis according to which one ought to believe a proposition just in case one’s degree of belief in it is sufficiently high. The permissibility solution replaces the Lockean thesis by the permissibility thesis according to which one is permitted to believe a proposition if one’s degree of belief in it is sufficiently high. This note shows that the epistemology of belief that results from the permissibility thesis and the epistemology of degrees of belief is empty in the sense that one need not believe anything, even if one’s degrees of belief are maximally bold. Since this result can also be achieved by simply dropping the Lockean thesis, or by replacing it with principles that are logically stronger than the permissibility thesis, the question arises what the permissibility solution is a solution of.

paper issue: 
17
paper title: 

WHY EPISTEMIC PERMISSIONS DON’T AGGLOMERATE – ANOTHER REPLY TO LITTLEJOHN (pages 451–455)

paper type: 
debate
paper author: 

Thomas KROEDEL

paper author family name: 

Thomas KROEDEL

paper abstract: 

ABSTRACT: Clayton Littlejohn claims that the permissibility solution to the lottery paradox requires an implausible principle in order to explain why epistemic permissions don’t agglomerate. This paper argues that an uncontentious principle suffices to explain this. It also discusses another objection of Littlejohn’s, according to which we’re not permitted to believe lottery propositions because we know that we’re not in a position to know them.

paper issue: 
14

HOW TO UNDERSTAND AND SOLVE THE LOTTERY PARADOX (pages 283–292)

Submitted by logos on Thu, 09/26/2013 - 17:13
paper title: 

HOW TO UNDERSTAND AND SOLVE THE LOTTERY PARADOX (pages 283–292)

paper type: 
article
paper author: 

Patrick BONDY

paper author family name: 

BONDY

paper abstract: 

ABSTRACT: It has been claimed that there is a lottery paradox for justification and an analogous paradox for knowledge, and that these two paradoxes should have a common solution. I argue that there is in fact no lottery paradox for knowledge, since that version of the paradox has a demonstrably false premise. The solution to the justification paradox is to deny closure of justification under conjunction. I present a principle which allows us to deny closure of justification under conjunction in certain kinds of cases, but which still allows that belief in a conjunction on the basis of justified belief in its conjuncts can often be justified. 

paper issue: 
13
paper title: 

THE PERMISSIBILITY SOLUTION TO THE LOTTERY PARADOX – REPLY TO LITTLEJOHN (pages 103–111)

paper type: 
debate
paper author: 

Thomas KROEDEL

paper author family name: 

KROEDEL

paper abstract: 

ABSTRACT: According to the permissibility solution to the lottery paradox, the paradox can be solved if we conceive of epistemic justification as a species of permissibility. Clayton Littlejohn has objected that the permissibility solution draws on a sufficient condition for permissible belief that has implausible consequences and that the solution conflicts with our lack of knowledge that a given lottery ticket will lose. The paper defends the permissibility solution against Littlejohn’s objections. 

paper issue: 
11
paper title: 

THE PERSISTENT PROBLEM OF THE LOTTERY PARADOX: AND ITS UNWELCOME CONSEQUENCES FOR CONTEXTUALISM (pages 85–100)

paper type: 
article
paper author: 

Travis TIMMERMAN

paper author family name: 

TIMMERMAN

paper abstract: 

ABSTRACT: This paper attempts to show that contextualism cannot adequately handle all versions of ‘The Lottery Paradox.” Although the application of contextualist rules is meant to vindicate the intuitive distinction between cases of knowledge and non-knowledge, it fails to do so when applied to certain versions of “The Lottery Paradox.” In making my argument, I first briefly explain why this issue should be of central importance for contextualism. I then review Lewis’ contextualism before offering my argument that the lottery paradox persists on all contextualist accounts. Although I argue that the contextualist does not fare well, hope nevertheless remains. For, on Lewis’ behalf, I offer what I take to be the best solution for the contextualist and argue that once this solution is adopted, contextualism will be in a better position to handle the lottery paradox than any other substantive epistemological theory. 

paper issue: 
11

LOTTERIES, PROBABILITIES, AND PERMISSIONS (pages 509-514)

Submitted by logos on Sun, 09/30/2012 - 08:42
paper title: 

LOTTERIES, PROBABILITIES, AND PERMISSIONS (pages 509-514)

paper type: 
debate
paper author: 

Clayton LITTLEJOHN

paper author family name: 

LITTLEJOHN

paper abstract: 

ABSTRACT: Thomas Kroedel argues that we can solve a version of the lottery paradox if we identify justified beliefs with permissible beliefs. Since permissions do not agglomerate, we might grant that someone could justifiably believe any ticket in a large and fair lottery is a loser without being permitted to believe that all the tickets will lose. I shall argue that Kroedel’s solution fails. While permissions do not agglomerate, we would have too many permissions if we characterized justified belief as sufficiently probable belief. If we reject the idea that justified beliefs can be characterized as sufficiently probably beliefs, Kroedel’s solution is otiose because the paradox can be dissolved at the outset.

paper issue: 
9

LOTTERIES, KNOWLEDGE, AND PRACTICAL REASONING (pages 225-231)

Submitted by logos on Tue, 06/28/2011 - 16:39
paper title: 

LOTTERIES, KNOWLEDGE, AND PRACTICAL REASONING (pages 225-231)

paper type: 
article
paper author: 

Rachel R. McKINNON

paper author family name: 

MCKINNON

paper abstract: 

ABSTRACT: This paper addresses an argument offered by John Hawthorne against the propriety of an agent’s using propositions she does not know as premises in practical reasoning. I will argue that there are a number of potential structural confounds in Hawthorne’s use of his main example, a case of practical reasoning about a lottery. By drawing these confounds out more explicitly, we can get a better sense of how to make appropriate use of such examples in theorizing about norms, knowledge, and practical reasoning. I will conclude by suggesting a prescription for properly using lottery propositions to do the sort of work that Hawthorne wants from them.

paper issue: 
4

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