testimony

A HUMEAN ACCOUNT OF TESTIMONIAL JUSTIFICATION (pages 209–219)

Submitted by logos on Tue, 07/01/2014 - 09:46
paper title: 

A HUMEAN ACCOUNT OF TESTIMONIAL JUSTIFICATION (pages 209–219)

paper type: 
article
paper author: 

Shane RYAN

paper author family name: 

RYAN

paper abstract: 

ABSTRACT: I argue that a Humean account can make sense of the phenomenology associated with testimonial justification; the phenomenology being that in standard cases hearers regularly simply accept a testifier’s assertions as true – hearers don't engage in monitoring. The upshot is that a Humean account is in a better position dialectically than is usually supposed. I provide some background to the debate before setting out two challenges facing accounts of testimonial justification. The first challenge is to provide an account that accords with the phenomenology of testimonial reception; the second challenge is to provide an account that can make sense of some testimonial beliefs enjoying greater justification than others. I show the credulist position to be vulnerable to the second challenge and the Humean position to be vulnerable to the first challenge. I argue that a Humean account, by drawing on dual process theory, can overcome the first challenge. 

paper issue: 
16

VIRTUE EPISTEMOLOGY, TESTIMONY, AND TRUST (pages 95–102)

Submitted by logos on Mon, 03/31/2014 - 17:19
paper title: 

VIRTUE EPISTEMOLOGY, TESTIMONY, AND TRUST (pages 95–102)

paper type: 
debate
paper author: 

Benjamin W. McCRAW

paper author family name: 

McCRAW

paper abstract: 

ABSTRACT: In this paper, I respond to an objection raised by Duncan Pritchard and Jesper Kallestrup against virtue epistemology. In particular, they argue that the virtue epistemologist must either deny that S knows that p only if S believes that p because of S’s virtuous operation or deny intuitive cases of testimonial knowledge. Their dilemma has roots in the apparent ease by which we obtain testimonial knowledge and, thus, how the virtue epistemologist can explain such knowledge in a way that both preserves testimonial knowledge and grounds it in one’s virtues. I argue that the virtue epistemologist has a way to accomplish both tasks if we take epistemic trust to be an intellectual virtue. I briefly discuss what such trust must look like and then apply it to the dilemma at hand: showing that a key intellectual virtue plausibly operates in cases of testimonial knowledge and/or belief. 

paper issue: 
15
paper title: 

WHAT I LEARNED IN THE LUNCH ROOM ABOUT ASSERTION AND PRACTICAL REASONING (pages 565-569)

paper type: 
article
paper author: 

Rachel R. McKINNON

paper author family name: 

McKINNON

paper abstract: 

ABSTRACT: It is increasingly argued that there is a single unified constitutive norm of both assertion and practical reasoning. The most common suggestion is that knowledge is this norm. If this is correct, then we would expect that a diagnosis of problematic assertions should manifest as problematic reasons for acting. Jennifer Lackey has recently argued that assertions epistemically grounded in isolated second-hand knowledge (ISHK) are unwarranted. I argue that decisions epistemically grounded in premises based on ISHK also seem inappropriate. I finish by suggesting that this finding has important implications for the debates regarding the norms of assertion and practical reasoning. 

paper issue: 
10

PEER-HOOD (pages 127-140)

Submitted by logos on Mon, 03/28/2011 - 10:16
paper title: 

PEER-HOOD (pages 127-140)

paper type: 
article
paper author: 

Richard D. VULICH

paper author family name: 

Richard D. VULICH

paper abstract: 

ABSTRACT: When one is involved in a disagreement with another individual it is important to know how much weight to give to the disputant's testimony. I argue that it is not necessary to have background information about the individual with whom one is disagreeing in order for one to rationally regard the disputant as an epistemic peer. I contrast this view with an alternative view according to which it is only rational to regard a disputant as a peer in cases where one has background information to indicate that the disputant is a peer. I show that unless we make some implausible assumptions about the truth-effectiveness of reconsideration, it is better to regard unknown disputants as peers because doing so increases the ratio of true to total beliefs in one's belief set.

paper pdf: 
paper issue: 
3
paper title: 

ASSERTION, TESTIMONY, AND THE EPISTEMIC SIGNIFICANCE OF SPEECH (pages 59-66)

paper type: 
article
paper author: 

Sanford GOLDBERG

paper author family name: 

GOLDBERG

paper abstract: 

ABSTRACT: Whether or not all assertion counts as testimony (a matter not addressed here), it is argued that not all testimony involves assertion. Since many views in the epistemology of testimony assume that testimony requires assertion, such views are (at best) insufficiently general. This result also points to what we might call the epistemic significance of assertion as such.

paper issue: 
1

GETTING GETTIER’D ON TESTIMONY (pages 361-369)

Submitted by logos on Mon, 12/27/2010 - 22:54
paper title: 

GETTING GETTIER’D ON TESTIMONY (pages 361-369)

paper type: 
article
paper author: 

Lauren J. LEYDON-HARDY

paper author family name: 

Leydon

paper abstract: 

ABSTRACT: There are noncontroversial ways in which our words are context dependent. Gradable adjectives like ‘flat’ or ‘bald’, for example. A more controversial proposition is that nouns can be context dependent in a reasonably similar way. If this is true, then it looks like we can develop a positive account of semantic content as sensitive to context. This might be worrying for the epistemology of testimony. That is, how can we garner knowledge from testimony if it’s the case that, though our syntactic utterances are identical, the semantic content of them may fail to be uniform? What if we mean different things by the same words? I argue that these kinds of semantic divergences provide the groundwork for a new kind of Gettier case. That is, given the likelihood of divergent semantic content, we can see a way to scenarios in which, despite that the semantic content is uniform, we might get justified true beliefs that nevertheless fail as knowledge. This, because it just as likely could have been the case that relevant contexts were dissimilar, and thus relevant semantic content would have been divergent. Lastly, where the losophie.hu-berlin.de">MoeckelC@Philosophie.hu-berlin.de.

paper issue: 
2

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