practical reasoning

paper title: 

WHY ASSERTION AND PRACTICAL REASONING ARE POSSIBLY NOT GOVERNED BY THE SAME EPISTEMIC NORM (pages 457–464)

paper type: 
debate
paper author: 

Robin McKENNA

paper author family name: 

McKENNA

paper abstract: 

ABSTRACT: This paper focuses on Martin Montminy’s recent attempt to show that assertion and practical reasoning are necessarily governed by the same epistemic norm (“Why Assertion and Practical Reasoning Must be Governed By the Same Epistemic Norm,” Pacific Philosophical Quarterly, 2013). I show that the attempt fails. I finish by considering the upshot for the recent debate concerning the connection between the epistemic norms of assertion and practical reasoning.

paper issue: 
14
paper title: 

WHAT I LEARNED IN THE LUNCH ROOM ABOUT ASSERTION AND PRACTICAL REASONING (pages 565-569)

paper type: 
article
paper author: 

Rachel R. McKINNON

paper author family name: 

McKINNON

paper abstract: 

ABSTRACT: It is increasingly argued that there is a single unified constitutive norm of both assertion and practical reasoning. The most common suggestion is that knowledge is this norm. If this is correct, then we would expect that a diagnosis of problematic assertions should manifest as problematic reasons for acting. Jennifer Lackey has recently argued that assertions epistemically grounded in isolated second-hand knowledge (ISHK) are unwarranted. I argue that decisions epistemically grounded in premises based on ISHK also seem inappropriate. I finish by suggesting that this finding has important implications for the debates regarding the norms of assertion and practical reasoning. 

paper issue: 
10
paper title: 

NOT-EXACT-TRUTHS, PRAGMATIC ENCROACHMENT AND THE EPISTEMIC NORM OF PRACTICAL REASONING (pages 239-259)

paper type: 
article
paper author: 

Michael J. SHAFFER

paper author family name: 

SHAFFER

paper abstract: 

ABSTRACT: Recently a number of variously motivated epistemologists have argued that knowledge is closely tied to practical matters. On the one hand, radical pragmatic encroachment is the view that facts about whether an agent has knowledge depend on practical factors and this is coupled to the view that there is an important connection between knowledge and action. On the other hand, one can argue for the less radical thesis only that there is an important connection between knowledge and practical reasoning. So, defenders of both of these views endorse the view that knowledge is the norm of practical reasoning. This thesis has recently come under heavy fire and a number of weaker proposals have been defended. In this paper counter-examples to the knowledge norm of reasoning will be presented and it will be argued that this view – and a number of related but weaker views – cannot be sustained in the face of these counter-examples. The paper concludes with a novel proposal concerning the norm of practical reasoning that is immune to the counter-examples introduced here.

paper issue: 
8

KNOWLEDGE, PRACTICAL REASONING AND ACTION (pages 7-26)

Submitted by logos on Wed, 03/28/2012 - 11:27
paper title: 

KNOWLEDGE, PRACTICAL REASONING AND ACTION (pages 7-26)

paper type: 
article
paper author: 

Peter BAUMANN

paper author family name: 

BAUMANN

paper abstract: 

ABSTRACT: Is knowledge necessary or sufficient or both necessary and sufficient for acceptable practical reasoning and rational action? Several authors (e.g., Williamson, Hawthorne, and Stanley) have recently argued that the answer to these questions is positive. In this paper I present several objections against this view (both in its basic form as well in more developed forms). I also offer a sketch of an alternative view: What matters for the acceptability of practical reasoning in at least many cases (and in all the cases discussed by the defenders of a strong link between knowledge and practical reasoning) is not so much knowledge but expected utility.

paper issue: 
7

LOTTERIES, KNOWLEDGE, AND PRACTICAL REASONING (pages 225-231)

Submitted by logos on Tue, 06/28/2011 - 16:39
paper title: 

LOTTERIES, KNOWLEDGE, AND PRACTICAL REASONING (pages 225-231)

paper type: 
article
paper author: 

Rachel R. McKINNON

paper author family name: 

MCKINNON

paper abstract: 

ABSTRACT: This paper addresses an argument offered by John Hawthorne against the propriety of an agent’s using propositions she does not know as premises in practical reasoning. I will argue that there are a number of potential structural confounds in Hawthorne’s use of his main example, a case of practical reasoning about a lottery. By drawing these confounds out more explicitly, we can get a better sense of how to make appropriate use of such examples in theorizing about norms, knowledge, and practical reasoning. I will conclude by suggesting a prescription for properly using lottery propositions to do the sort of work that Hawthorne wants from them.

paper issue: 
4

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