probability

paper title: 

THE PERMISSIBILITY SOLUTION TO THE LOTTERY PARADOX – REPLY TO LITTLEJOHN (pages 103–111)

paper type: 
debate
paper author: 

Thomas KROEDEL

paper author family name: 

KROEDEL

paper abstract: 

ABSTRACT: According to the permissibility solution to the lottery paradox, the paradox can be solved if we conceive of epistemic justification as a species of permissibility. Clayton Littlejohn has objected that the permissibility solution draws on a sufficient condition for permissible belief that has implausible consequences and that the solution conflicts with our lack of knowledge that a given lottery ticket will lose. The paper defends the permissibility solution against Littlejohn’s objections. 

paper issue: 
11

LOTTERIES, PROBABILITIES, AND PERMISSIONS (pages 509-514)

Submitted by logos on Sun, 09/30/2012 - 08:42
paper title: 

LOTTERIES, PROBABILITIES, AND PERMISSIONS (pages 509-514)

paper type: 
debate
paper author: 

Clayton LITTLEJOHN

paper author family name: 

LITTLEJOHN

paper abstract: 

ABSTRACT: Thomas Kroedel argues that we can solve a version of the lottery paradox if we identify justified beliefs with permissible beliefs. Since permissions do not agglomerate, we might grant that someone could justifiably believe any ticket in a large and fair lottery is a loser without being permitted to believe that all the tickets will lose. I shall argue that Kroedel’s solution fails. While permissions do not agglomerate, we would have too many permissions if we characterized justified belief as sufficiently probable belief. If we reject the idea that justified beliefs can be characterized as sufficiently probably beliefs, Kroedel’s solution is otiose because the paradox can be dissolved at the outset.

paper issue: 
9
paper title: 

THE BADNESS OF BEING CERTAIN OF A FALSEHOOD IS AT LEAST 1/(log 4 − 1) TIMES GREATER THAN THE VALUE OF BEING CERTAIN OF A TRUTH (pages 229-238)

paper type: 
article
paper author: 

Alexander R. PRUSS

paper author family name: 

Alexander R. PRUSS

paper abstract: 

ABSTRACT: Surprisingly precise results are provided on how much more one should disvalue being wrong than one values being right. 

paper issue: 
8

WHAT EINSTEIN WANTED (pages 233-252)

Submitted by logos on Tue, 06/28/2011 - 16:40
paper title: 

WHAT EINSTEIN WANTED (pages 233-252)

paper type: 
article
paper author: 

Nicholas RESCHER

paper author family name: 

RESCHER

paper abstract: 

ABSTRACT: Einstein envisioned a clear difference between a bottom-up physics that moves from observations to the conjecture of explanatory generalizations, and a topdown physics that deploys intuitively natural principles (especially of economy and elegance) to explain the observations. Einstein’s doubts regarding standard quantum mechanics thus did not simply lie in this theory’s use of probabilities. Rather, what he objected to was their status as merely phenomenological quantities configured to accommodate observation, and thereby lacking any basis of derivation from considerations of general principle.

paper issue: 
4

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