knowledge

RECOVERING PLATO: A PLATONIC VIRTUE EPISTEMOLOGY (pages 7–31)

Submitted by logos on Mon, 03/31/2014 - 17:14
paper title: 

RECOVERING PLATO: A PLATONIC VIRTUE EPISTEMOLOGY (pages 7–31)

paper type: 
article
paper author: 

James FILLER

paper author family name: 

FILLER

paper abstract: 

ABSTRACT: Recently, there has been a move in contemporary epistemological philosophy toward a virtue epistemology, which sees certain character traits of the rational agent as critical in the acquisition of knowledge. This attempt to introduce virtue into epistemological investigations has, however, relied almost exclusively on an Aristotelian account of virtue. In this paper, I attempt to take a new tack and examine a virtue epistemological account grounded in Platonic thought. Taking seriously the distinction between knowledge and opinion found in the Republic, I then draw upon two virtues, humility and what I call sincerity, to flesh out this account. 

paper issue: 
15
paper title: 

EXPLICATING A STANDARD EXTERNALIST ARGUMENT AGAINST THE KK PRINCIPLE (pages 399–406)

paper type: 
article
paper author: 

Simon D'ALFONSO

paper author family name: 

D'ALFONSO

paper abstract: 

ABSTRACT: The KK principle is typically rejected in externalist accounts of knowledge. However, a standard general argument for this rejection is in need of a supportive explication. In a recent paper, Samir Okasha argues that the standard externalist argument in question is fallacious. In this paper I start off with some critical discussion of Okasha’s analysis before suggesting an alternative way in which an externalist might successfully present such a case. I then further explore this issue via a look at how Fred Dretske’s externalist epistemology, one of the exemplifying accounts, can explain failure of the KK principle. 

paper issue: 
14

ANOTHER BLOW TO KNOWLEDGE FROM KNOWLEDGE (pages 311–317)

Submitted by logos on Thu, 09/26/2013 - 17:22
paper title: 

ANOTHER BLOW TO KNOWLEDGE FROM KNOWLEDGE (pages 311–317)

paper type: 
article
paper author: 

Peter MURPHY

paper author family name: 

MURPHY

paper abstract: 

ABSTRACT: A novel argument is offered against the following popular condition on inferential knowledge: a person inferentially knows a conclusion only if they know each of the claims from which they essentially inferred that conclusion. The epistemology of conditional proof reveals that we sometimes come to know conditionals by inferring them from assumptions rather than beliefs. Since knowledge requires belief, cases of knowing via conditional proof refute the popular knowledge from knowledge condition. It also suggests more radical cases against the condition and it brings to light the under-recognized category of inferential basic knowledge. 

paper issue: 
13
paper title: 

LEVELLING THE ANALYSIS OF KNOWLEDGE VIA METHODOLOGICAL SCEPTICISM (pages 293–304)

paper type: 
article
paper author: 

William A. BRANT

paper author family name: 

BRANT

paper abstract: 

ABSTRACT: In this essay I provide one methodology that yields the level of analysis of an alleged knowledge-claim under investigation via its relations to varying gradations of scepticism. Each proposed knowledge-claim possesses a specified relationship with: (i) a globally sceptical argument; (ii) the least sceptical but successful argument that casts it into doubt; and (iii) the most sceptical yet unsuccessful argument, which is conceivably hypothesized to repudiate it but fails to do so. Yielding this specified set of relations, by means of proceeding from global scepticism to (ii) and (iii), increases the chances of identifying the highest evaluative relevancy of the levels of analysis and observation of an alleged knowledge-claim. I argue that the failure to analyse and derive a difference between (i) and (ii) with respect to an alleged knowledge-claim signifies that the claim is grounded within the theoretical framework itself, that the claim lacks specification with regard to content that is analysable via that framework, and the claim is dubious insofar as alternative theoretic frameworks may present greater relevancy to levels of observation. 

paper issue: 
13

HOW TO UNDERSTAND AND SOLVE THE LOTTERY PARADOX (pages 283–292)

Submitted by logos on Thu, 09/26/2013 - 17:13
paper title: 

HOW TO UNDERSTAND AND SOLVE THE LOTTERY PARADOX (pages 283–292)

paper type: 
article
paper author: 

Patrick BONDY

paper author family name: 

BONDY

paper abstract: 

ABSTRACT: It has been claimed that there is a lottery paradox for justification and an analogous paradox for knowledge, and that these two paradoxes should have a common solution. I argue that there is in fact no lottery paradox for knowledge, since that version of the paradox has a demonstrably false premise. The solution to the justification paradox is to deny closure of justification under conjunction. I present a principle which allows us to deny closure of justification under conjunction in certain kinds of cases, but which still allows that belief in a conjunction on the basis of justified belief in its conjuncts can often be justified. 

paper issue: 
13

DON’T KNOW, DON’T BELIEVE: REPLY TO KROEDEL (pages 231–238)

Submitted by logos on Sat, 06/29/2013 - 08:11
paper title: 

DON’T KNOW, DON’T BELIEVE: REPLY TO KROEDEL (pages 231–238)

paper type: 
debate
paper author: 

Clayton LITTLEJOHN

paper author family name: 

LITTLEJOHN

paper abstract: 

ABSTRACT: In recent work, Thomas Kroedel has proposed a novel solution to the lottery paradox. As he sees it, we are permitted/justified in believing some lottery propositions, but we are not permitted/justified in believing them all. I criticize this proposal on two fronts. First, I think that if we had the right to add some lottery beliefs to our belief set, we would not have any decisive reason to stop adding more. Suggestions to the contrary run into the wrong kind of reason problem. Reflection on the preface paradox suggests as much. Second, while I agree with Kroedel that permissions do not agglomerate, I do not think that this fact can help us solve the lottery paradox. First, I do not think we have any good reason to think that we’re permitted to believe any lottery propositions. Second, I do not see any good reason to think that epistemic permissions do not agglomerate.

paper issue: 
12

KNOWLEDGE AND PERSISTENCE (pages 161–177)

Submitted by logos on Sat, 06/29/2013 - 07:59
paper title: 

KNOWLEDGE AND PERSISTENCE (pages 161–177)

paper type: 
article
paper author: 

Stephen SKERRY

paper author family name: 

SKERRY

paper abstract: 

ABSTRACT: States are states, in part, because they persist through time. Knowing is one such state, and it often persists beyond the time when evidence is first apprehended. The consequences for epistemology of this persistence are explored, including what are termed ‘unearned knowledge,’ and ‘one-sided knowledge.’ Knowing that you are not dreaming is one (important) example of unearned and one-sided knowing. The author contends that arguments for scepticism and for knowing as a purley mental state are undermined when this persistence is properly understood.

paper issue: 
12

KNOWLEDGE ESSENTIALLY BASED UPON FALSE BELIEF (pages 7–19)

Submitted by logos on Sun, 03/31/2013 - 10:44
paper title: 

KNOWLEDGE ESSENTIALLY BASED UPON FALSE BELIEF (pages 7–19)

paper type: 
article
paper author: 

Avram HILLER

paper author family name: 

HILLER

paper abstract: 

ABSTRACT: Richard Feldman and William Lycan have defended a view according to which a necessary condition for a doxastic agent to have knowledge is that the agent’s belief is not essentially based on any false assumptions. I call this the no-essential-false-assumption account, or NEFA. Peter Klein considers examples of what he calls “useful false beliefs” and alters his own account of knowledge in a way which can be seen as a refinement of NEFA. This paper shows that NEFA, even given Klein’s refinement, is subject to counterexample: a doxastic agent may possess knowledge despite having an essential false assumption. Advocates of NEFA could simply reject the intuition that the example is a case of knowledge. However, if the example is interpreted as not being a case of knowledge, then it can be used as a potential counterexample against both safety and sensitivity views of knowledge. I also provide a further case which, I claim, is problematic for all of the accounts just mentioned. I then propose, briefly, an alternative account of knowledge which handles all these cases appropriately. 

paper issue: 
11

MOOREAN SENTENCES AND THE NORM OF ASSERTION (pages 653-658)

Submitted by logos on Fri, 12/28/2012 - 11:02
paper title: 

MOOREAN SENTENCES AND THE NORM OF ASSERTION (pages 653-658)

paper type: 
debate
paper author: 

Michael J. SHAFFER

paper author family name: 

SHAFFER

paper abstract: 

ABSTRACT: In this paper Timothy Williamson’s argument that the knowledge norm of assertion is the best explanation of the unassertability of Morrean sentences is challenged and an alternative account of the norm of assertion is defended. 

paper issue: 
10

SAVING SOSA’S SAFETY (pages 637-652)

Submitted by logos on Fri, 12/28/2012 - 11:01
paper title: 

SAVING SOSA’S SAFETY (pages 637-652)

paper type: 
debate
paper author: 

Mark McBRIDE

paper author family name: 

McBRIDE

paper abstract: 

ABSTRACT: My purpose in this paper is to (begin to) defend safety as a necessary condition on knowledge. First, I introduce Ernest Sosa’s (1999) safety condition. Second, I set up and grapple with Juan Comesaña’s recent putative counterexample to safety as a necessary condition on knowledge; Comesaña’s case forces us to consider Sosa’s updated (2002) safety condition. From such grappling a principled modification to Sosa’s (2002) safety condition emerges. Safety is safe from this, and like, attacks. 

paper issue: 
10

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