knowledge

paper title: 

JUSTIFICATION AND TRUTH CONDITIONS IN THE CONCEPT OF KNOWLEDGE (pages 429-447)

paper type: 
article
paper author: 

Dale JACQUETTE

paper author family name: 

JACQUETTE

paper abstract: 

ABSTRACT: The traditional concept of propositional knowledge as justified true belief (JTB), even when modified, typically in its justification condition, to avoid Gettier-type counterexamples, remains subject to a variety of criticisms. The redefinition proposed here puts pressure more specifically on the concept of truth as redundant in light of and inaccessible beyond the most robust requirements of best justification. Best-J is defined as justification for believing in a proposition’s truth where there is no better countermanding justification for believing instead the proposition’s negation. A pragmatic perspective argues that truth is unnecessary and unattainable as a condition of knowledge beyond the requirement for practically attainable best justified belief. The key argument with respect to the eliminability of the truth condition in favor of a properly tailored justification condition is that there is nothing we do or can do in trying to satisfy the truth condition for knowledge beyond considering the epistemic merits of the justification that a believer accepts in coming to believe that the proposition is true.

paper issue: 
9

STUMBLING IN NOZICK’S TRACKS (pages 291-293)

Submitted by logos on Thu, 06/28/2012 - 08:51
paper title: 

STUMBLING IN NOZICK’S TRACKS (pages 291-293)

paper type: 
debate
paper author: 

John TURRI

paper author family name: 

TURRI

paper abstract: 

ABSTRACT: Rachael Briggs and Daniel Nolan have recently proposed an improved version of Nozick’s tracking account of knowledge. I show that, despite its virtues, the new proposal suffers from three serious problems. 

paper issue: 
8
paper title: 

NOT-EXACT-TRUTHS, PRAGMATIC ENCROACHMENT AND THE EPISTEMIC NORM OF PRACTICAL REASONING (pages 239-259)

paper type: 
article
paper author: 

Michael J. SHAFFER

paper author family name: 

SHAFFER

paper abstract: 

ABSTRACT: Recently a number of variously motivated epistemologists have argued that knowledge is closely tied to practical matters. On the one hand, radical pragmatic encroachment is the view that facts about whether an agent has knowledge depend on practical factors and this is coupled to the view that there is an important connection between knowledge and action. On the other hand, one can argue for the less radical thesis only that there is an important connection between knowledge and practical reasoning. So, defenders of both of these views endorse the view that knowledge is the norm of practical reasoning. This thesis has recently come under heavy fire and a number of weaker proposals have been defended. In this paper counter-examples to the knowledge norm of reasoning will be presented and it will be argued that this view – and a number of related but weaker views – cannot be sustained in the face of these counter-examples. The paper concludes with a novel proposal concerning the norm of practical reasoning that is immune to the counter-examples introduced here.

paper issue: 
8

IS THERE PROPOSITIONAL UNDERSTANDING? (pages 181-192)

Submitted by logos on Wed, 06/27/2012 - 14:49
paper title: 

IS THERE PROPOSITIONAL UNDERSTANDING? (pages 181-192)

paper type: 
article
paper author: 

Emma C. GORDON

paper author family name: 

GORDON

paper abstract: 

ABSTRACT: Literature in epistemology tends to suppose that there are three main types of understanding – propositional, atomistic, and objectual. By showing that all apparent instances of propositional understanding can be more plausibly explained as featuring one of several other epistemic states, this paper argues that talk of propositional understanding is unhelpful and misleading. The upshot is that epistemologists can do without the notion of propositional understanding. 

paper issue: 
8

KNOWLEDGE, PRACTICAL REASONING AND ACTION (pages 7-26)

Submitted by logos on Wed, 03/28/2012 - 11:27
paper title: 

KNOWLEDGE, PRACTICAL REASONING AND ACTION (pages 7-26)

paper type: 
article
paper author: 

Peter BAUMANN

paper author family name: 

BAUMANN

paper abstract: 

ABSTRACT: Is knowledge necessary or sufficient or both necessary and sufficient for acceptable practical reasoning and rational action? Several authors (e.g., Williamson, Hawthorne, and Stanley) have recently argued that the answer to these questions is positive. In this paper I present several objections against this view (both in its basic form as well in more developed forms). I also offer a sketch of an alternative view: What matters for the acceptability of practical reasoning in at least many cases (and in all the cases discussed by the defenders of a strong link between knowledge and practical reasoning) is not so much knowledge but expected utility.

paper issue: 
7

DEFENDING INTEREST–RELATIVE INVARIANTISM (pages 591-609)

Submitted by logos on Tue, 12/27/2011 - 12:42
paper title: 

DEFENDING INTEREST–RELATIVE INVARIANTISM (pages 591-609)

paper type: 
article
paper author: 

Brian WEATHERSON

paper author family name: 

WEATHERSON

paper abstract: 

ABSTRACT: I defend interest-relative invariantism from a number of recent attacks. One common thread to my response is that interest-relative invariantism is a much weaker thesis than is often acknowledged, and a number of the attacks only challenge very specific, and I think implausible, versions of it. Another is that a number of the attacks fail to acknowledge how many things we have independent reason to believe knowledge is sensitive to. Whether there is a defeater for someone's knowledge can be sensitive to all manner of features of their environment, as the host of examples from the post-Gettier literature shows. Adding in interest-sensitive defeaters is a much less radical move than most critics claim it is.

paper issue: 
6

MYTHOLOGY OF THE FACTIVE (pages 143-152)

Submitted by logos on Mon, 03/28/2011 - 10:17
paper title: 

MYTHOLOGY OF THE FACTIVE (pages 143-152)

paper type: 
debate
paper author: 

John TURRI

paper author family name: 

TURRI

paper abstract: 

ABSTRACT: It’s a cornerstone of epistemology that knowledge requires truth—that is, that knowledge is factive. Allan Hazlett boldly challenges orthodoxy by arguing that the ordinary concept of knowledge is not factive. On this basis Hazlett further argues that epistemologists shouldn’t concern themselves with the ordinary concept of knowledge, or knowledge ascriptions and related linguistic phenomena. I argue that either Hazlett is wrong about the ordinary concept of knowledge, or he’s right in a way that leaves epistemologists to carry on exactly as they have, paying attention to much the same things they always did.

paper issue: 
3

HEALTHY SKEPTICISM AND PRACTICAL WISDOM (pages 87-102)

Submitted by logos on Mon, 03/28/2011 - 10:12
paper title: 

HEALTHY SKEPTICISM AND PRACTICAL WISDOM (pages 87-102)

paper type: 
article
paper author: 

Pierre LE MORVAN

paper author family name: 

LE MORVAN

paper abstract: 

ABSTRACT. This paper explores and articulates an alternative to the two main approaches that have come to predominate in contemporary philosophical discussions of skepticism. These we may call the ‘Foil Approach’ and the ‘Bypass Approach’ respectively. On the Foil Approach, skepticism is treated as a problem to be solved, or challenge to be met, or threat to be parried; skepticism’s value, insofar as it is deemed to have one, accrues from its role as a foil contrastively illuminating what is required for knowledge and justified belief. On the Bypass Approach, skepticism is bypassed as a central concern of epistemology. In this paper, I articulate an alternative to both these approaches, one that explores when skepticism is healthy and when it is not. I call it the ‘Health Approach’ to skepticism.

paper issue: 
3

LITERATURE AND KNOWLEDGE. A NEW VERSION OF AN OLD STORY (pages 7-19)

Submitted by logos on Mon, 03/28/2011 - 09:42
paper title: 

LITERATURE AND KNOWLEDGE. A NEW VERSION OF AN OLD STORY (pages 7-19)

paper type: 
article
paper author: 

Bogdan CREȚU

paper author family name: 

CREȚU

paper abstract: 

ABSTRACT: This paper tries to discuss some of the theories concerning the relation between literature and knowledge. On the one hand, most of the time, philosophers do not believe in the force of literature to generate knowledge. On the other, litterateurs are more optimistic, considering that there is a specific kind of knowledge that literature (sometimes they emphasize: only literature) is able to deliver. These are the two antagonistic theories I have to arbitrate in this paper. In my opinion, literature is an ally of science and philosophy and it can provide a large amount of knowledge about some aspects of reality that cannot be put into concepts. Some examples like dreams and love regarded both by philosophers and writers try to demonstrate that sometimes only literature can conquer some territories of the human mind and sensibility. At the end, the paper asserts, along with Peter Swirski, that interdisciplinarity is a compulsory condition if we want to take advantage from the whole knowledge that sciences, as well as arts, among which literature is to be mentioned, can offer us. The conclusion is borrowed from Milan Kundera’s Art of the Novel: Knowledge is the literature’s only morality.

paper issue: 
3

THE GETTIER NON-PROBLEM (pages 85-108)

Submitted by logos on Tue, 12/28/2010 - 16:10
paper title: 

THE GETTIER NON-PROBLEM (pages 85-108)

paper type: 
article
paper author: 

Stephen HETHERINGTON

paper author family name: 

HETHERINGTON

paper abstract: 

ABSTRACT: This paper highlights an aspect of Gettier situations, one standardly not accorded interpretive significance. A remark of Gettier’s suggests its potential importance. And once that aspect’s contribution is made explicit, an argument unfolds for the conclusion that it is fairly simple to have knowledge within Gettier situations. Indeed, that argument dissolves the traditional Gettier problem.

paper issue: 
1

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