knowledge

paper title: 

ASSERTION, TESTIMONY, AND THE EPISTEMIC SIGNIFICANCE OF SPEECH (pages 59-66)

paper type: 
article
paper author: 

Sanford GOLDBERG

paper author family name: 

GOLDBERG

paper abstract: 

ABSTRACT: Whether or not all assertion counts as testimony (a matter not addressed here), it is argued that not all testimony involves assertion. Since many views in the epistemology of testimony assume that testimony requires assertion, such views are (at best) insufficiently general. This result also points to what we might call the epistemic significance of assertion as such.

paper issue: 
1

SELF-EVIDENCE (pages 325-352)

Submitted by logos on Mon, 12/27/2010 - 23:03
paper title: 

SELF-EVIDENCE (pages 325-352)

paper type: 
article
paper author: 

Carl GINET

paper author family name: 

Ginet

paper abstract: 

ABSTRACT: This paper develops an account of what it is for a proposition to be selfevident to someone, based on the idea that certain propositions are such that to fully understand them is to believe them. It argues that when a proposition p is self-evident to one, one has non-inferential a priori justification for believing that p and, a welcome feature, a justification that does not involve exercising any special sort of intuitive faculty; if, in addition, it is true that p and there exists no reason to believe that the proposition that p is incoherent, then one knows a priori that p. The paper argues that certain deeply contingent truths, e.g., the truth that I would now express by saying “I exist”, can be self-evident to, and thus known a priori by, the person they are about at the time they are about; but, since they cannot be known a priori, or even expressed, by anyone else or at any other time, they should not count as a priori truths.

paper pdf: 
paper issue: 
2

EPISTEMIC CLOSURE AND SKEPTICISM (pages 221-246)

Submitted by logos on Mon, 12/27/2010 - 22:50
paper title: 

EPISTEMIC CLOSURE AND SKEPTICISM (pages 221-246)

paper type: 
article
paper author: 

John A. BARKER, Fred ADAMS

paper author family name: 

Barker

paper abstract: 

ABSTRACT: Closure is the epistemological thesis that if S knows that P and knows that P implies Q, then if S infers that Q, S knows that Q. Fred Dretske acknowledges that closure is plausible but contends that it should be rejected because it conflicts with the plausible thesis: Conclusive reasons (CR): S knows that P only if S believes P on the basis of conclusive reasons, i.e., reasons S wouldn’t have if it weren’t the case that P. Dretske develops an analysis of knowing that centers on CR, and argues that the requirement undermines skepticism by implying the falsity of closure. We develop a Dretske-style analysis of knowing that incorporates CR, and we argue that this analysis not only accords with closure, but also implies it. In addition, we argue that the analysis accounts for the prima facie plausibility of closure-invoking skeptical arguments, and nonetheless implies that they are fallacious. If our arguments turn out to be sound, the acceptability of Dretske’s analysis of knowing will be significantly enhanced by the fact that, despite implying closure, it undermines closure-based skepticism.

paper issue: 
2

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