dogmatism

paper title: 

PHENOMENAL CONSERVATISM AND SELF-DEFEAT ARGUMENTS: A REPLY TO HUEMER (pages 343-350)

paper type: 
debate
paper author: 

Moti MIZRAHI

paper author family name: 

Moti MIZRAHI

paper abstract: 

ABSTRACT: In this paper, I respond to Michael Huemer’s reply to my objection against Phenomenal Conservatism (PC). I have argued that Huemer’s Self-defeat Argument for PC does not favor PC over competing theories of basic propositional justification, since analogous self-defeat arguments can be constructed for competing theories. Huemer responds that such analogous self-defeat arguments are unsound. In this paper, I argue that Huemer’s reply does not save his Self-defeat Argument for PC from my original objection.

paper issue: 
17

ALTERNATIVE SELF-DEFEAT ARGUMENTS: A REPLY TO MIZRAHI (pages 223–229)

Submitted by logos on Tue, 07/01/2014 - 09:47
paper title: 

ALTERNATIVE SELF-DEFEAT ARGUMENTS: A REPLY TO MIZRAHI (pages 223–229)

paper type: 
debate
paper author: 

Michael HUEMER

paper author family name: 

HUEMER

paper abstract: 

ABSTRACT: I address Moti Mizrahi’s objections to my use of the Self-Defeat Argument for Phenomenal Conservatism (PC). Mizrahi contends that other epistemological theories can be supported by parallel self-defeat arguments. I argue that the self-defeat arguments for other theories either (a) are compatible with PC and thus present no problem, or (b) have a false premise, unlike the self-defeat argument for PC. 

paper issue: 
16
paper title: 

PHENOMENAL CONSERVATISM, JUSTIFICATION, AND SELF-DEFEAT (pages 103–110)

paper type: 
debate
paper author: 

Moti MIZRAHI

paper author family name: 

MIZRAHI

paper abstract: 

ABSTRACT: In this paper, I argue that Phenomenal Conservatism (PC) is not superior to alternative theories of basic propositional justification insofar as those theories that reject PC are self-defeating. I show that self-defeat arguments similar to Michael Huemer’s Self-Defeat Argument for PC can be constructed for other theories of basic propositional justification as well. If this is correct, then there is nothing special about PC in that respect. In other words, if self-defeat arguments can be advanced in support of alternatives to PC, then Huemer’s Self-Defeat argument doesn’t uniquely motivate PC. 

paper issue: 
15

A PUZZLE FOR DOGMATISM (pages 295-302)

Submitted by logos on Tue, 06/28/2011 - 16:49
paper title: 

A PUZZLE FOR DOGMATISM (pages 295-302)

paper type: 
discussion note
paper author: 

Mark MCBRIDE

paper author family name: 

MCBRIDE

paper abstract: 

ABSTRACT: I want to consider a puzzle in the realm of confirmation theory. The puzzle arises from consideration of reasoning with an argument, given certain epistemological commitments. Here is the argument (preceded by the stipulated justification for the first premise):

     (JUSTIFICATION FOR 1) The table looks red.
     (EK)     (1) The table is red.
                   (2) If the table is red, then it is not white with red lights shining on it.
                   (3) The table is not white with red lights shining on it.
(EK) – the easy knowledge argument – has received much epistemological scrutiny of late. My aim, in this discussion note, is to set out an example, leading to the puzzle, putatively troubling for dogmatism. The puzzle takes the form of a pair of arguments which I take to be extractable from the recent work of a number of prominent epistemologists. My aim is modest: I seek not novelty, but rather merely to tie together accessibly some interesting recent work towards the formal end of epistemology which bears on cruxes at the heart of traditional epistemology.

paper issue: 
4

Powered by Drupal 6 | web development: Codrin Dinu Vasiliu

Powered by Drupal, an open source content management system
Syndicate content
© 2010 Logos & Episteme | An International Journal of Epistemology. Drupal theme by Kiwi Themes.