evidence

AN ARGUMENT AGAINST THE POSSIBILITY OF GETTIERED BELIEFS (pages 265-272)

Submitted by logos on Tue, 09/30/2014 - 07:32
paper title: 

AN ARGUMENT AGAINST THE POSSIBILITY OF GETTIERED BELIEFS (pages 265-272)

paper type: 
article
paper author: 

Benoit GAULTIER

paper author family name: 

GAULTIER

paper abstract: 

ABSTRACT: In this paper, I propose a new argument against Gettier’s counterexamples to the thesis that knowledge is justified true belief. I claim that if there is no doxastic voluntarism, and if it is admitted that one has formed the belief that p at t1 if, at t0, one would be surprised to learn or discover that not-p, it can be plausibly argued that Gettiered beliefs simply cannot be formed.

paper issue: 
17

ARE EPISTEMIC REASONS EVER REASONS TO PROMOTE? (pages 353–360)

Submitted by logos on Thu, 09/26/2013 - 17:27
paper title: 

ARE EPISTEMIC REASONS EVER REASONS TO PROMOTE? (pages 353–360)

paper type: 
debate
paper author: 

Clayton LITTLEJOHN

paper author family name: 

LITTLEJOHN

paper abstract: 

ABSTRACT: In trying to distinguish the right kinds of reasons from the wrong, epistemologists often appeal to the connection to truth to explain why practical considerations cannot constitute reasons. The view they typically opt for is one on which only evidence can constitute a reason to believe. Brian Talbot has shown that these approaches don’t exclude the possibility that there are non-evidential reasons for belief that can justify a belief without being evidence for that belief. He thinks that there are indeed such reasons and that they are the right kind of reasons to justify belief. The existence of such truth promoting non-epistemic reasons is said to follow from the fact that we have an epistemic end that involves the attainment of true belief. I shall argue that there are no such reasons precisely because there is an epistemic end that has normative authority. 

paper issue: 
13
paper title: 

ON THE NECESSITY OF THE EVIDENTIAL EQUALITY CONDITION FOR EPISTEMIC PEERAGE (pages 113–123)

paper type: 
debate
paper author: 

Michele PALMIRA

paper author family name: 

PALMIRA

paper abstract: 

ABSTRACT: A popular definition of epistemic peerage maintains that two subjects are epistemic peers if and only if they are equals with respect to general epistemic virtues and share the same evidence about the targeted issue. In this paper I shall take up the challenge of defending the necessity of the evidential equality condition for a definition of epistemic peerage from criticisms that can be elicited from the literature on peer disagreement. The paper discusses two definitions that drop this condition and argues that they yield implausible verdicts about the instantiation of the epistemic peerage relation. 

paper issue: 
11

LOTTERIES, PROBABILITIES, AND PERMISSIONS (pages 509-514)

Submitted by logos on Sun, 09/30/2012 - 08:42
paper title: 

LOTTERIES, PROBABILITIES, AND PERMISSIONS (pages 509-514)

paper type: 
debate
paper author: 

Clayton LITTLEJOHN

paper author family name: 

LITTLEJOHN

paper abstract: 

ABSTRACT: Thomas Kroedel argues that we can solve a version of the lottery paradox if we identify justified beliefs with permissible beliefs. Since permissions do not agglomerate, we might grant that someone could justifiably believe any ticket in a large and fair lottery is a loser without being permitted to believe that all the tickets will lose. I shall argue that Kroedel’s solution fails. While permissions do not agglomerate, we would have too many permissions if we characterized justified belief as sufficiently probable belief. If we reject the idea that justified beliefs can be characterized as sufficiently probably beliefs, Kroedel’s solution is otiose because the paradox can be dissolved at the outset.

paper issue: 
9

ARE REASONS EVIDENCE OF OUGHTS? (pages 157-164)

Submitted by logos on Wed, 03/28/2012 - 11:48
paper title: 

ARE REASONS EVIDENCE OF OUGHTS? (pages 157-164)

paper type: 
debate
paper author: 

Franck LIHOREAU

paper author family name: 

LIHOREAU

paper abstract: 

ABSTRACT:In a series of recent papers Stephen Kearns and Daniel Star argue that normative reasons to ϕ simply are evidence that one ought to ϕ, and suggest that “evidence” in this context is best understood in standard Bayesian terms. I contest this suggestion.

paper issue: 
7

DEFENDING INTEREST–RELATIVE INVARIANTISM (pages 591-609)

Submitted by logos on Tue, 12/27/2011 - 12:42
paper title: 

DEFENDING INTEREST–RELATIVE INVARIANTISM (pages 591-609)

paper type: 
article
paper author: 

Brian WEATHERSON

paper author family name: 

WEATHERSON

paper abstract: 

ABSTRACT: I defend interest-relative invariantism from a number of recent attacks. One common thread to my response is that interest-relative invariantism is a much weaker thesis than is often acknowledged, and a number of the attacks only challenge very specific, and I think implausible, versions of it. Another is that a number of the attacks fail to acknowledge how many things we have independent reason to believe knowledge is sensitive to. Whether there is a defeater for someone's knowledge can be sensitive to all manner of features of their environment, as the host of examples from the post-Gettier literature shows. Adding in interest-sensitive defeaters is a much less radical move than most critics claim it is.

paper issue: 
6

EVIDENCE AND TRANSMISSION FAILURE (pages 557-574)

Submitted by logos on Tue, 12/27/2011 - 12:36
paper title: 

EVIDENCE AND TRANSMISSION FAILURE (pages 557-574)

paper type: 
article
paper author: 

Mark McBRIDE

paper author family name: 

McBRIDE

paper abstract: 

ABSTRACT: Some philosophers (can be taken to) claim that there are no genuine instances of transmission failure provided we operate with the right account of the sources of warrant-or-evidence for future reasoning. My aim in this paper is to (begin to) clear the way for instances of transmission failure regardless of the account of the sources of warrant-or-evidence for future reasoning with which one operates. My aim is not to claim there are in fact genuine instances of transmission failure; merely to render it possible, on all – or most – plausible accounts of the sources of warrant-or-evidence for future reasoning.

paper issue: 
6

THE CASE FOR RATIONAL UNIQUENESS (pages 359-373)

Submitted by logos on Thu, 09/29/2011 - 11:34
paper title: 

THE CASE FOR RATIONAL UNIQUENESS (pages 359-373)

paper type: 
article
paper author: 

Jonathan MATHESON

paper author family name: 

MATHESON

paper abstract: 

ABSTRACT: The Uniqueness Thesis, or rational uniqueness, claims that a body of evidence severely constrains one’s doxastic options. In particular, it claims that for any body of evidence E and proposition P, E justifies at most one doxastic attitude toward P. In this paper I defend this formulation of the uniqueness thesis and examine the case for its truth. I begin by clarifying my formulation of the Uniqueness Thesis and examining its close relationship to evidentialism. I proceed to give some motivation for this strong epistemic claim and to defend it from several recent objections in the literature. In particular I look at objections to the Uniqueness Thesis coming from considerations of rational disagreement (can’t reasonable people disagree?), the breadth of doxastic attitudes (can’t what is justified by the evidence encompass more than one doxastic attitude?), borderline cases and caution (can’t it be rational to be cautious and suspend judgment even when the evidence slightly supports belief?), vagueness (doesn’t the vagueness of justification spell trouble for the Uniqueness Thesis?), and degrees of belief (doesn’t a finegrained doxastic picture present additional problems for the Uniqueness Thesis?).

paper issue: 
5

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