rationality

JUSTIFICATION AND THE UNIQUENESS THESIS (pages 571-577)

Submitted by logos on Fri, 12/28/2012 - 10:53
paper title: 

JUSTIFICATION AND THE UNIQUENESS THESIS (pages 571-577)

paper type: 
article
paper author: 

Luis ROSA

paper author family name: 

ROSA

paper abstract: 

ABSTRACT: In this paper, I offer two counterexamples to the so-called ‘Uniqueness Thesis.’ As one of these examples rely on the thesis that it is possible for a justified belief to be based on an inconsistent body of evidence, I also offer reasons for this further thesis. On the assumption that doxastic justification entails propositional justification, the counterexamples seem to work. 

paper issue: 
10
paper title: 

JUSTIFIED BELIEVING IS TRACKING YOUR EVIDENTIAL COMMITMENTS (pages 545-564)

paper type: 
article
paper author: 

Barry LAM

paper author family name: 

LAM

paper abstract: 

ABSTRACT: In this paper, I give an account of the conditions for rationally changing your beliefs that respects three constraints; 1) that rational believing is a matter of respecting your evidence, 2) that evidence seems to have both objective and subjective features, and (3) that our set of beliefs seem to rationally commit us to certain propositions, regardless of the evidential support we have for these propositions. On the view I outline, rationally believing or giving up a belief is a matter of your inferences tracking your rational commitments, and that these rational commitments account for the evidence you must respect. These rational commitments are subjective in that they are relative to the totality of your beliefs, but also objective in the sense that what counts as a commitment is true for everyone everywhere. 

paper issue: 
10

ARE REASONS EVIDENCE OF OUGHTS? (pages 157-164)

Submitted by logos on Wed, 03/28/2012 - 11:48
paper title: 

ARE REASONS EVIDENCE OF OUGHTS? (pages 157-164)

paper type: 
debate
paper author: 

Franck LIHOREAU

paper author family name: 

LIHOREAU

paper abstract: 

ABSTRACT:In a series of recent papers Stephen Kearns and Daniel Star argue that normative reasons to ϕ simply are evidence that one ought to ϕ, and suggest that “evidence” in this context is best understood in standard Bayesian terms. I contest this suggestion.

paper issue: 
7
paper title: 

AN ARROVIAN IMPOSSIBILITY THEOREM FOR THE EPISTEMOLOGY OF DISAGREEMENT (pages 97-115)

paper type: 
article
paper author: 

Nicholaos JONES

paper author family name: 

JONES

paper abstract: 

ABSTRACT: According to conciliatory views about the epistemology of disagreement, when epistemic peers have conflicting doxastic attitudes toward a proposition and fully disclose to one another the reasons for their attitudes toward that proposition (and neither has independent reason to believe the other to be mistaken), each peer should always change his attitude toward that proposition to one that is closer to the attitudes of those peers with which there is disagreement. According to pure higher-order evidence views, higher-order evidence for a proposition always suffices to determine the proper rational response to disagreement about that proposition within a group of epistemic peers. Using an analogue of Arrow's Impossibility Theorem, I shall argue that no conciliatory and pure higher-order evidence view about the epistemology of disagreement can provide a true and general answer to the question of what disagreeing epistemic peers should do after fully disclosing to each other the (first-order) reasons for their conflicting doxastic attitudes.

paper issue: 
7
paper title: 

RETHINKING THE DEBRIEFING PARADIGM: THE RATIONALITY OF BELIEF PERSEVERANCE (pages 51-74)

paper type: 
article
paper author: 

David M. GODDEN

paper author family name: 

M. GODDEN

paper abstract: 

ABSTRACT: By examining particular cases of belief perseverance following the undermining of their original evidentiary grounds, this paper considers two theories of rational belief revision: foundation and coherence. Gilbert Harman has argued for coherence over foundationalism on the grounds that the foundations theory absurdly deems most of our beliefs to be not rationally held. A consequence of the unacceptability of foundationalism is that belief perseverance is rational. This paper defends the intuitive judgement that belief perseverance is irrational by offering a competing explanation of what goes on in cases like the debriefing paradigm which does not rely upon foundationalist principles but instead shows that such cases are properly viewed as instances of positive undermining of the sort described by the coherence theory.

paper issue: 
7

THE CASE FOR RATIONAL UNIQUENESS (pages 359-373)

Submitted by logos on Thu, 09/29/2011 - 11:34
paper title: 

THE CASE FOR RATIONAL UNIQUENESS (pages 359-373)

paper type: 
article
paper author: 

Jonathan MATHESON

paper author family name: 

MATHESON

paper abstract: 

ABSTRACT: The Uniqueness Thesis, or rational uniqueness, claims that a body of evidence severely constrains one’s doxastic options. In particular, it claims that for any body of evidence E and proposition P, E justifies at most one doxastic attitude toward P. In this paper I defend this formulation of the uniqueness thesis and examine the case for its truth. I begin by clarifying my formulation of the Uniqueness Thesis and examining its close relationship to evidentialism. I proceed to give some motivation for this strong epistemic claim and to defend it from several recent objections in the literature. In particular I look at objections to the Uniqueness Thesis coming from considerations of rational disagreement (can’t reasonable people disagree?), the breadth of doxastic attitudes (can’t what is justified by the evidence encompass more than one doxastic attitude?), borderline cases and caution (can’t it be rational to be cautious and suspend judgment even when the evidence slightly supports belief?), vagueness (doesn’t the vagueness of justification spell trouble for the Uniqueness Thesis?), and degrees of belief (doesn’t a finegrained doxastic picture present additional problems for the Uniqueness Thesis?).

paper issue: 
5

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