evidentialism

DO YOU KNOW THAT YOU ARE NOT A BRAIN IN A VAT? (pages 161–181)

Submitted by logos on Tue, 07/01/2014 - 09:42
paper title: 

DO YOU KNOW THAT YOU ARE NOT A BRAIN IN A VAT? (pages 161–181)

paper type: 
article
paper author: 

Ned MARKOSIAN

paper author family name: 

MARKOSIAN

paper abstract: 

ABSTRACT: The topic of this paper is the familiar problem of skepticism about the external world. How can you know that you are not a brain in a vat being fooled by alien scientists? And if you can’t know that, how can you know anything about the external world? The paper assumes Evidentialism as a theory about justification, and then argues that you are justified in believing that you are not a brain in a vat, in virtue of the fact that your evidence supports that belief. The paper also considers a number of different objections to this proposal. The upshot is that you do know that you are a not a brain in a vat, and that you also know lots of things about the external world. 

paper issue: 
16
paper title: 

INTERNALIST EVIDENTIALISM AND EPISTEMIC VIRTUE: RE-REPLY TO AXTELL (pages 281-289)

paper type: 
debate
paper author: 

Trent DOUGHERTY

paper author family name: 

DOUGHERTY

paper abstract: 

ABSTRACT: In this brief re-reply to Axtell, I reply to key criticisms of my previous reply and flesh out a bit my notions of the relationship between internalist evidentialism and epistemic virtue and epistemic value. 

paper issue: 
8

RE-REDUCING RESPONSIBILITY: REPLY TO AXTELL (pages 625-632)

Submitted by logos on Tue, 12/27/2011 - 12:49
paper title: 

RE-REDUCING RESPONSIBILITY: REPLY TO AXTELL (pages 625-632)

paper type: 
debate
paper author: 

Trent DOUGHERTY

paper author family name: 

DOUGHERTY

paper abstract: 

ABSTRACT: In this brief reply to Axtell, I review some general considerations pertaining to the disagreement and then reply point-by-point to Axtell's critique of the dilemma I pose for responsibilists in virtue epistemology. Thus I re-affirm my reductionist identity thesis that every case of epistemic irresponsibility is either a case of ordinary moral irresponsibility or ordinary practical irrationality.

paper issue: 
6

RECOVERING RESPONSIBILITY (pages 429-454)

Submitted by logos on Thu, 09/29/2011 - 11:41
paper title: 

RECOVERING RESPONSIBILITY (pages 429-454)

paper type: 
debate
paper author: 

Guy AXTELL

paper author family name: 

AXTELL

paper abstract: 

ABSTRACT: This paper defends the epistemological importance of ‘diachronic’ or crosstemporal evaluation of epistemic agents against an interesting dilemma posed for this view in Trent Dougherty’s recent paper “Reducing Responsibility.” This is primarily a debate between evidentialists and character epistemologists, and key issues of contention that the paper treats include the divergent functions of synchronic and diachronic (longitudinal) evaluations of agents and their beliefs, the nature and sources of epistemic normativity, and the advantages versus the costs of the evidentialists’ reductionism about sources of epistemic normativity.

paper issue: 
5

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