Gettier cases

AN ARGUMENT AGAINST THE POSSIBILITY OF GETTIERED BELIEFS (pages 265-272)

Submitted by logos on Tue, 09/30/2014 - 07:32
paper title: 

AN ARGUMENT AGAINST THE POSSIBILITY OF GETTIERED BELIEFS (pages 265-272)

paper type: 
article
paper author: 

Benoit GAULTIER

paper author family name: 

GAULTIER

paper abstract: 

ABSTRACT: In this paper, I propose a new argument against Gettier’s counterexamples to the thesis that knowledge is justified true belief. I claim that if there is no doxastic voluntarism, and if it is admitted that one has formed the belief that p at t1 if, at t0, one would be surprised to learn or discover that not-p, it can be plausibly argued that Gettiered beliefs simply cannot be formed.

paper issue: 
17

THE GETTIER NON-PROBLEM (pages 85-108)

Submitted by logos on Tue, 12/28/2010 - 16:10
paper title: 

THE GETTIER NON-PROBLEM (pages 85-108)

paper type: 
article
paper author: 

Stephen HETHERINGTON

paper author family name: 

HETHERINGTON

paper abstract: 

ABSTRACT: This paper highlights an aspect of Gettier situations, one standardly not accorded interpretive significance. A remark of Gettier’s suggests its potential importance. And once that aspect’s contribution is made explicit, an argument unfolds for the conclusion that it is fairly simple to have knowledge within Gettier situations. Indeed, that argument dissolves the traditional Gettier problem.

paper issue: 
1

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