knowledge account of assertion

PREEMPTING PARADOX (pages 659-662)

Submitted by logos on Fri, 12/28/2012 - 11:03
paper title: 

PREEMPTING PARADOX (pages 659-662)

paper type: 
debate
paper author: 

John TURRI

paper author family name: 

TURRI

paper abstract: 

ABSTRACT: Charlie Pelling has recently argued that two leading accounts of the norm of assertion, the truth account and a version of the knowledge account, invite paradox and so must be false. Pelling’s arguments assume that an isolated utterance of the sentence “This assertion is improper” counts as making an assertion. I argue that this assumption is questionable. 

paper pdf: 
paper issue: 
10
paper title: 

PROMISES TO KEEP: SPEECH ACTS AND THE VALUE OF REFLECTIVE KNOWLEDGE (pages 583-590)

paper type: 
article
paper author: 

John TURRI

paper author family name: 

TURRI

paper abstract: 

ABSTRACT: This paper offers a new account of reflective knowledge’s value, building on recent work on the epistemic norms of speech acts. Reflective knowledge is valuable because it licenses us to make guarantees and promises.

paper issue: 
6

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