peer disagreement

FOLEY’S SELF-TRUST AND RELIGIOUS DISAGREEMENT (pages 217–226)

Submitted by logos on Sat, 06/29/2013 - 08:07
paper title: 

FOLEY’S SELF-TRUST AND RELIGIOUS DISAGREEMENT (pages 217–226)

paper type: 
debate
paper author: 

Tomas BOGARDUS

paper author family name: 

BOGARDUS

paper abstract: 

ABSTRACT: In this paper, I’ll look at the implications of Richard Foley’s epistemology for two different kinds of religious disagreement. First, there are those occasions on which a stranger testifies to me that she holds disagreeing religious beliefs. Typically, I’m dismissive of such religious disagreement, and I bet you are too. Richard Foley gives reasons to think that we need not be at all conciliatory in the face of stranger disagreement, but I’ll explain why his reasons are insufficient. After that, I’ll look at those types of religious disagreement that occur between epistemic peers . Foley has argued for a conciliatory position. I worry that his position leads to what some in the literature have called “spinelessness.” I also worry that his view is self-defeating, and vulnerable to some apparent counterexamples. I’ll end the paper by sketching my own, non-Foleyan, solution to those problems.

paper issue: 
12

PHILOSOPHICAL PEER DISAGREEMENT (pages 459-467)

Submitted by logos on Sun, 09/30/2012 - 08:29
paper title: 

PHILOSOPHICAL PEER DISAGREEMENT (pages 459-467)

paper type: 
article
paper author: 

Nicolás LO GUERCIO

paper author family name: 

LO GUERCIO

paper abstract: 

ABSTRACT: It has been widely discussed, in recent years, which is the rational doxastic reaction in the face of peer disagreement. But not much has been said about an interesting instance of that debate: philosophical peer disagreement. That is precisely what I will be concerned with in this paper. First, I will offer a definition of philosophical peer that introduces the idea of an epistemic perspective. The proposed definition allows for a doublé distinction: between Strong and Weak Peers, and between Strong and Weak Disagreements. Based on these distinctions, I will defend that different doxastic reactions are required depending on the type of disagreement at issue. On the one hand, in the face of Weak Disagreement, we should be conciliatory. Cases of Strong disagreement, in turn, shouldn’t motívate a doxastic revision. In order to argue for that, some refinements into the notion of Rational Uniqueness will be needed.

paper issue: 
9
paper title: 

AN ARROVIAN IMPOSSIBILITY THEOREM FOR THE EPISTEMOLOGY OF DISAGREEMENT (pages 97-115)

paper type: 
article
paper author: 

Nicholaos JONES

paper author family name: 

JONES

paper abstract: 

ABSTRACT: According to conciliatory views about the epistemology of disagreement, when epistemic peers have conflicting doxastic attitudes toward a proposition and fully disclose to one another the reasons for their attitudes toward that proposition (and neither has independent reason to believe the other to be mistaken), each peer should always change his attitude toward that proposition to one that is closer to the attitudes of those peers with which there is disagreement. According to pure higher-order evidence views, higher-order evidence for a proposition always suffices to determine the proper rational response to disagreement about that proposition within a group of epistemic peers. Using an analogue of Arrow's Impossibility Theorem, I shall argue that no conciliatory and pure higher-order evidence view about the epistemology of disagreement can provide a true and general answer to the question of what disagreeing epistemic peers should do after fully disclosing to each other the (first-order) reasons for their conflicting doxastic attitudes.

paper issue: 
7

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