reliabilism

paper title: 

EXPLICATING A STANDARD EXTERNALIST ARGUMENT AGAINST THE KK PRINCIPLE (pages 399–406)

paper type: 
article
paper author: 

Simon D'ALFONSO

paper author family name: 

D'ALFONSO

paper abstract: 

ABSTRACT: The KK principle is typically rejected in externalist accounts of knowledge. However, a standard general argument for this rejection is in need of a supportive explication. In a recent paper, Samir Okasha argues that the standard externalist argument in question is fallacious. In this paper I start off with some critical discussion of Okasha’s analysis before suggesting an alternative way in which an externalist might successfully present such a case. I then further explore this issue via a look at how Fred Dretske’s externalist epistemology, one of the exemplifying accounts, can explain failure of the KK principle. 

paper issue: 
14

IN DEFENSE OF VIRTUE-RESPONSIBILISM (pages 201–216)

Submitted by logos on Sat, 06/29/2013 - 08:05
paper title: 

IN DEFENSE OF VIRTUE-RESPONSIBILISM (pages 201–216)

paper type: 
debate
paper author: 

Christopher BOBIER

paper author family name: 

BOBIER

paper abstract: 

ABSTRACT: Modest realism affirms that some of the objects of our beliefs exist independently of our beliefs. That is, there is a mind-independent world that we can epistemically access. The Cartesian skeptic claims that we can’t offer any non-questionbegging arguments in favor of modest realism and therefore we are not justified in believing that modest realism is true. Reliabilists argue that the skeptic assumes an evidentialist-internalist account of justification and that a proper account of justification jettisons this. Hence, our belief in modest realism can be justified. I argue in this paper that virtue-responsibilism offers an analogous response to the Cartesian skeptic. According to the virtue-responsibilist, my belief that P is an instance of knowledge iff it maps onto reality and is the result of an act of virtue. I show that the virtueresponsibilist theory excludes evidentialist-internalism, and allows for our belief in modest realism to be justified. However, it may be objected that the virtue-responsibilist can’t offer non-question-begging reasons for thinking that the virtues are reliable. I argue that this objection fails and that we can know that the virtues are reliable by empirical study. Thus, virtue-responsibilism provides a satisfactory response to the Cartesian skeptic.

paper issue: 
12

RETHINKING THE A PRIORI/A POSTERIORI DISTINCTION (pages 261-277)

Submitted by logos on Wed, 06/27/2012 - 14:58
paper title: 

RETHINKING THE A PRIORI/A POSTERIORI DISTINCTION (pages 261-277)

paper type: 
article
paper author: 

Jennifer Wilson MULNIX

paper author family name: 

MULNIX

paper abstract: 

ABSTRACT: This paper offers an account of the a priori/a posteriori distinction utilizing the insights of reliabilism, focusing on the inputs to reliable belief-forming processes. I propose that a belief possesses a priori justification if it is the result of a reliable belief-producing process whose input is ‘non-sensory’ and the reliability of this process does not ‘causally depend’ on the reliability of a prior process taking in ‘sensory’ input. One of the interesting consequences of this account is in the treatment of introspective knowledge of one’s belief-states; it was classically considered a posteriori, but comes out a priori on this model. 

paper issue: 
8

THE TEMPORAL GENERALITY PROBLEM (pages 117-122)

Submitted by logos on Wed, 03/28/2012 - 11:38
paper title: 

THE TEMPORAL GENERALITY PROBLEM (pages 117-122)

paper type: 
article
paper author: 

Brian WEATHERSON

paper author family name: 

WEATHERSON

paper abstract: 

ABSTRACT: The traditional generality problem for process reliabilism concerns the difficulty in identifying each belief forming process with a particular kind of process. That identification is necessary since individual belief forming processes are typically of many kinds, and those kinds may vary in reliability. I raise a new kind of generality problem, one which turns on the difficulty of identifying beliefs with processes by which they were formed. This problem arises because individual beliefs may be the culmination of overlapping processes of distinct lengths, and these processes may differ in reliability. I illustrate the force of this problem with a discussion of recent work on the bootstrapping problem.

paper issue: 
7

Powered by Drupal 6 | web development: Codrin Dinu Vasiliu

Powered by Drupal, an open source content management system
Syndicate content
© 2010 Logos & Episteme | An International Journal of Epistemology. Drupal theme by Kiwi Themes.