assertion

paper title: 

WHY ASSERTION AND PRACTICAL REASONING ARE POSSIBLY NOT GOVERNED BY THE SAME EPISTEMIC NORM (pages 457–464)

paper type: 
debate
paper author: 

Robin McKENNA

paper author family name: 

McKENNA

paper abstract: 

ABSTRACT: This paper focuses on Martin Montminy’s recent attempt to show that assertion and practical reasoning are necessarily governed by the same epistemic norm (“Why Assertion and Practical Reasoning Must be Governed By the Same Epistemic Norm,” Pacific Philosophical Quarterly, 2013). I show that the attempt fails. I finish by considering the upshot for the recent debate concerning the connection between the epistemic norms of assertion and practical reasoning.

paper issue: 
14

PARADOXICAL ASSERTIONS: A REPLY TO TURRI (pages 239–241)

Submitted by logos on Sat, 06/29/2013 - 08:17
paper title: 

PARADOXICAL ASSERTIONS: A REPLY TO TURRI (pages 239–241)

paper type: 
debate
paper author: 

Charlie PELLING

paper author family name: 

PELLING

paper abstract: 

ABSTRACT: In earlier work, I have argued that the self-referential assertion that “this assertion is improper” is paradoxical for the truth account of assertion, the view on which an assertion is proper if and only if it is true. In a recent paper in this journal, John Turri has suggested a response to the paradox: one might simply deny that in uttering “this assertion is improper” one makes a genuine assertion. In this paper, I argue that this ‘no assertion’ response does not dissolve the paradox in the way Turri suggests.

paper issue: 
12

PREEMPTING PARADOX (pages 659-662)

Submitted by logos on Fri, 12/28/2012 - 11:03
paper title: 

PREEMPTING PARADOX (pages 659-662)

paper type: 
debate
paper author: 

John TURRI

paper author family name: 

TURRI

paper abstract: 

ABSTRACT: Charlie Pelling has recently argued that two leading accounts of the norm of assertion, the truth account and a version of the knowledge account, invite paradox and so must be false. Pelling’s arguments assume that an isolated utterance of the sentence “This assertion is improper” counts as making an assertion. I argue that this assumption is questionable. 

paper pdf: 
paper issue: 
10

MOOREAN SENTENCES AND THE NORM OF ASSERTION (pages 653-658)

Submitted by logos on Fri, 12/28/2012 - 11:02
paper title: 

MOOREAN SENTENCES AND THE NORM OF ASSERTION (pages 653-658)

paper type: 
debate
paper author: 

Michael J. SHAFFER

paper author family name: 

SHAFFER

paper abstract: 

ABSTRACT: In this paper Timothy Williamson’s argument that the knowledge norm of assertion is the best explanation of the unassertability of Morrean sentences is challenged and an alternative account of the norm of assertion is defended. 

paper issue: 
10
paper title: 

WHAT I LEARNED IN THE LUNCH ROOM ABOUT ASSERTION AND PRACTICAL REASONING (pages 565-569)

paper type: 
article
paper author: 

Rachel R. McKINNON

paper author family name: 

McKINNON

paper abstract: 

ABSTRACT: It is increasingly argued that there is a single unified constitutive norm of both assertion and practical reasoning. The most common suggestion is that knowledge is this norm. If this is correct, then we would expect that a diagnosis of problematic assertions should manifest as problematic reasons for acting. Jennifer Lackey has recently argued that assertions epistemically grounded in isolated second-hand knowledge (ISHK) are unwarranted. I argue that decisions epistemically grounded in premises based on ISHK also seem inappropriate. I finish by suggesting that this finding has important implications for the debates regarding the norms of assertion and practical reasoning. 

paper issue: 
10

A NOTE ON ASSERTION, RELATIVISM AND FUTURE CONTINGENTS (pages 143-148)

Submitted by logos on Wed, 03/28/2012 - 11:46
paper title: 

A NOTE ON ASSERTION, RELATIVISM AND FUTURE CONTINGENTS (pages 143-148)

paper type: 
debate
paper author: 

J. Adam CARTER

paper author family name: 

CARTER

paper abstract: 

ABSTRACT: I argue that John MacFarlane's attempt to reconcile his proposed truth-relativist account of future contingents with a plausible account of assertion is self-defeating. Specifically, a paradoxical result of MacFarlane's view is that assertions of future contingents are impermissible for anyone who already accepts MacFarlane's own truth-relativist account of future contingents. 

paper issue: 
7

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