subjectivity

CONSCIOUSNESS SHOULD NOT BE CONFUSED WITH QUALIA (pages 63–91)

Submitted by logos on Mon, 03/31/2014 - 17:17
paper title: 

CONSCIOUSNESS SHOULD NOT BE CONFUSED WITH QUALIA (pages 63–91)

paper type: 
article
paper author: 

Frederic PETERS

paper author family name: 

PETERS

paper abstract: 

ABSTRACT: The equation of consciousness with qualia, of wakeful awareness with awareness-of-cognitive content (perceptions, conceptions, emotions), while intuitively attractive, and formally referenced as the primary index of consciousness by many philosophers, psychologists, and neuroscientists, nevertheless has significant difficulties specifying precisely what it is that distinguishes conscious from non-conscious cognition. Moreover, there is a surprisingly robust congruence of evidence to the contrary, supporting the notion that consciousness, as a state of reflexive awareness, is distinct from the content one is aware of, that this awareness/content amalgam is actually the product of an incorporation process of various intermittent, and constantly varying streams of content onto a pre-existing reflexively conscious state which is not reliant on these streams for its constitution as a reflexive state. Consciousness, the evidence strongly indicates, is not qualia, not the awareness of this or that perceptual, conceptual or emotional content, but reflexive, autonoetic awareness as such. 

paper issue: 
15

BEYOND MODES OF OBJECTIVITY (pages 361-371)

Submitted by logos on Sun, 09/30/2012 - 08:07
paper title: 

BEYOND MODES OF OBJECTIVITY (pages 361-371)

paper type: 
article
paper author: 

Robert ALBIN

paper author family name: 

ALBIN

paper abstract: 

ABSTRACT: Frege, and others who followed him, stressed the role of fallibility as a means to defining ‘objectivity.’ By defining objective judgments as fallible, these philosophers contributed to the consolidation of a theory of objectivity which suggested interpreting epistemological, as well as other judgements, as being objective. An important philosophical implication of this theory lies in its disclosure of the interrelations between truth and objectivity. In light of this insight, and based on an analysis of instances of false (epistemological and other) judgments, I show that truth and objectivity go hand-in-hand, while falsity and objectivity do not. This finding alone indicates the necessity to revise the theory of objectivity.

paper issue: 
9

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