truth

PARADOXICAL ASSERTIONS: A REPLY TO TURRI (pages 239–241)

Submitted by logos on Sat, 06/29/2013 - 08:17
paper title: 

PARADOXICAL ASSERTIONS: A REPLY TO TURRI (pages 239–241)

paper type: 
debate
paper author: 

Charlie PELLING

paper author family name: 

PELLING

paper abstract: 

ABSTRACT: In earlier work, I have argued that the self-referential assertion that “this assertion is improper” is paradoxical for the truth account of assertion, the view on which an assertion is proper if and only if it is true. In a recent paper in this journal, John Turri has suggested a response to the paradox: one might simply deny that in uttering “this assertion is improper” one makes a genuine assertion. In this paper, I argue that this ‘no assertion’ response does not dissolve the paradox in the way Turri suggests.

paper issue: 
12
paper title: 

JUSTIFICATION AND TRUTH CONDITIONS IN THE CONCEPT OF KNOWLEDGE (pages 429-447)

paper type: 
article
paper author: 

Dale JACQUETTE

paper author family name: 

JACQUETTE

paper abstract: 

ABSTRACT: The traditional concept of propositional knowledge as justified true belief (JTB), even when modified, typically in its justification condition, to avoid Gettier-type counterexamples, remains subject to a variety of criticisms. The redefinition proposed here puts pressure more specifically on the concept of truth as redundant in light of and inaccessible beyond the most robust requirements of best justification. Best-J is defined as justification for believing in a proposition’s truth where there is no better countermanding justification for believing instead the proposition’s negation. A pragmatic perspective argues that truth is unnecessary and unattainable as a condition of knowledge beyond the requirement for practically attainable best justified belief. The key argument with respect to the eliminability of the truth condition in favor of a properly tailored justification condition is that there is nothing we do or can do in trying to satisfy the truth condition for knowledge beyond considering the epistemic merits of the justification that a believer accepts in coming to believe that the proposition is true.

paper issue: 
9

BEYOND MODES OF OBJECTIVITY (pages 361-371)

Submitted by logos on Sun, 09/30/2012 - 08:07
paper title: 

BEYOND MODES OF OBJECTIVITY (pages 361-371)

paper type: 
article
paper author: 

Robert ALBIN

paper author family name: 

ALBIN

paper abstract: 

ABSTRACT: Frege, and others who followed him, stressed the role of fallibility as a means to defining ‘objectivity.’ By defining objective judgments as fallible, these philosophers contributed to the consolidation of a theory of objectivity which suggested interpreting epistemological, as well as other judgements, as being objective. An important philosophical implication of this theory lies in its disclosure of the interrelations between truth and objectivity. In light of this insight, and based on an analysis of instances of false (epistemological and other) judgments, I show that truth and objectivity go hand-in-hand, while falsity and objectivity do not. This finding alone indicates the necessity to revise the theory of objectivity.

paper issue: 
9

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