Thomas Kroedel

paper title: 

WHAT IS THE PERMISSIBILITY SOLUTION A SOLUTION OF? – A QUESTION FOR KROEDEL (pages 333-342)

paper type: 
debate
paper author: 

Franz HUBER

paper author family name: 

HUBER

paper abstract: 

ABSTRACT: Kroedel has proposed a new solution, the permissibility solution, to the lottery paradox. The lottery paradox results from the Lockean thesis according to which one ought to believe a proposition just in case one’s degree of belief in it is sufficiently high. The permissibility solution replaces the Lockean thesis by the permissibility thesis according to which one is permitted to believe a proposition if one’s degree of belief in it is sufficiently high. This note shows that the epistemology of belief that results from the permissibility thesis and the epistemology of degrees of belief is empty in the sense that one need not believe anything, even if one’s degrees of belief are maximally bold. Since this result can also be achieved by simply dropping the Lockean thesis, or by replacing it with principles that are logically stronger than the permissibility thesis, the question arises what the permissibility solution is a solution of.

paper issue: 
17

DON’T KNOW, DON’T BELIEVE: REPLY TO KROEDEL (pages 231–238)

Submitted by logos on Sat, 06/29/2013 - 08:11
paper title: 

DON’T KNOW, DON’T BELIEVE: REPLY TO KROEDEL (pages 231–238)

paper type: 
debate
paper author: 

Clayton LITTLEJOHN

paper author family name: 

LITTLEJOHN

paper abstract: 

ABSTRACT: In recent work, Thomas Kroedel has proposed a novel solution to the lottery paradox. As he sees it, we are permitted/justified in believing some lottery propositions, but we are not permitted/justified in believing them all. I criticize this proposal on two fronts. First, I think that if we had the right to add some lottery beliefs to our belief set, we would not have any decisive reason to stop adding more. Suggestions to the contrary run into the wrong kind of reason problem. Reflection on the preface paradox suggests as much. Second, while I agree with Kroedel that permissions do not agglomerate, I do not think that this fact can help us solve the lottery paradox. First, I do not think we have any good reason to think that we’re permitted to believe any lottery propositions. Second, I do not see any good reason to think that epistemic permissions do not agglomerate.

paper issue: 
12

LOTTERIES, PROBABILITIES, AND PERMISSIONS (pages 509-514)

Submitted by logos on Sun, 09/30/2012 - 08:42
paper title: 

LOTTERIES, PROBABILITIES, AND PERMISSIONS (pages 509-514)

paper type: 
debate
paper author: 

Clayton LITTLEJOHN

paper author family name: 

LITTLEJOHN

paper abstract: 

ABSTRACT: Thomas Kroedel argues that we can solve a version of the lottery paradox if we identify justified beliefs with permissible beliefs. Since permissions do not agglomerate, we might grant that someone could justifiably believe any ticket in a large and fair lottery is a loser without being permitted to believe that all the tickets will lose. I shall argue that Kroedel’s solution fails. While permissions do not agglomerate, we would have too many permissions if we characterized justified belief as sufficiently probable belief. If we reject the idea that justified beliefs can be characterized as sufficiently probably beliefs, Kroedel’s solution is otiose because the paradox can be dissolved at the outset.

paper issue: 
9

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