paradox

PARADOXICAL ASSERTIONS: A REPLY TO TURRI (pages 239–241)

Submitted by logos on Sat, 06/29/2013 - 08:17
paper title: 

PARADOXICAL ASSERTIONS: A REPLY TO TURRI (pages 239–241)

paper type: 
debate
paper author: 

Charlie PELLING

paper author family name: 

PELLING

paper abstract: 

ABSTRACT: In earlier work, I have argued that the self-referential assertion that “this assertion is improper” is paradoxical for the truth account of assertion, the view on which an assertion is proper if and only if it is true. In a recent paper in this journal, John Turri has suggested a response to the paradox: one might simply deny that in uttering “this assertion is improper” one makes a genuine assertion. In this paper, I argue that this ‘no assertion’ response does not dissolve the paradox in the way Turri suggests.

paper issue: 
12

PREEMPTING PARADOX (pages 659-662)

Submitted by logos on Fri, 12/28/2012 - 11:03
paper title: 

PREEMPTING PARADOX (pages 659-662)

paper type: 
debate
paper author: 

John TURRI

paper author family name: 

TURRI

paper abstract: 

ABSTRACT: Charlie Pelling has recently argued that two leading accounts of the norm of assertion, the truth account and a version of the knowledge account, invite paradox and so must be false. Pelling’s arguments assume that an isolated utterance of the sentence “This assertion is improper” counts as making an assertion. I argue that this assumption is questionable. 

paper pdf: 
paper issue: 
10

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