Peter Klein

ANOTHER BLOW TO KNOWLEDGE FROM KNOWLEDGE (pages 311–317)

Submitted by logos on Thu, 09/26/2013 - 17:22
paper title: 

ANOTHER BLOW TO KNOWLEDGE FROM KNOWLEDGE (pages 311–317)

paper type: 
article
paper author: 

Peter MURPHY

paper author family name: 

MURPHY

paper abstract: 

ABSTRACT: A novel argument is offered against the following popular condition on inferential knowledge: a person inferentially knows a conclusion only if they know each of the claims from which they essentially inferred that conclusion. The epistemology of conditional proof reveals that we sometimes come to know conditionals by inferring them from assumptions rather than beliefs. Since knowledge requires belief, cases of knowing via conditional proof refute the popular knowledge from knowledge condition. It also suggests more radical cases against the condition and it brings to light the under-recognized category of inferential basic knowledge. 

paper issue: 
13

KNOWLEDGE ESSENTIALLY BASED UPON FALSE BELIEF (pages 7–19)

Submitted by logos on Sun, 03/31/2013 - 10:44
paper title: 

KNOWLEDGE ESSENTIALLY BASED UPON FALSE BELIEF (pages 7–19)

paper type: 
article
paper author: 

Avram HILLER

paper author family name: 

HILLER

paper abstract: 

ABSTRACT: Richard Feldman and William Lycan have defended a view according to which a necessary condition for a doxastic agent to have knowledge is that the agent’s belief is not essentially based on any false assumptions. I call this the no-essential-false-assumption account, or NEFA. Peter Klein considers examples of what he calls “useful false beliefs” and alters his own account of knowledge in a way which can be seen as a refinement of NEFA. This paper shows that NEFA, even given Klein’s refinement, is subject to counterexample: a doxastic agent may possess knowledge despite having an essential false assumption. Advocates of NEFA could simply reject the intuition that the example is a case of knowledge. However, if the example is interpreted as not being a case of knowledge, then it can be used as a potential counterexample against both safety and sensitivity views of knowledge. I also provide a further case which, I claim, is problematic for all of the accounts just mentioned. I then propose, briefly, an alternative account of knowledge which handles all these cases appropriately. 

paper issue: 
11

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