epistemic permission

paper title: 

WHY EPISTEMIC PERMISSIONS DON’T AGGLOMERATE – ANOTHER REPLY TO LITTLEJOHN (pages 451–455)

paper type: 
debate
paper author: 

Thomas KROEDEL

paper author family name: 

Thomas KROEDEL

paper abstract: 

ABSTRACT: Clayton Littlejohn claims that the permissibility solution to the lottery paradox requires an implausible principle in order to explain why epistemic permissions don’t agglomerate. This paper argues that an uncontentious principle suffices to explain this. It also discusses another objection of Littlejohn’s, according to which we’re not permitted to believe lottery propositions because we know that we’re not in a position to know them.

paper issue: 
14
paper title: 

THE PERMISSIBILITY SOLUTION TO THE LOTTERY PARADOX – REPLY TO LITTLEJOHN (pages 103–111)

paper type: 
debate
paper author: 

Thomas KROEDEL

paper author family name: 

KROEDEL

paper abstract: 

ABSTRACT: According to the permissibility solution to the lottery paradox, the paradox can be solved if we conceive of epistemic justification as a species of permissibility. Clayton Littlejohn has objected that the permissibility solution draws on a sufficient condition for permissible belief that has implausible consequences and that the solution conflicts with our lack of knowledge that a given lottery ticket will lose. The paper defends the permissibility solution against Littlejohn’s objections. 

paper issue: 
11

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