lying

LIES AND DECEPTION: A FAILED RECONCILIATION (pages 227–230)

Submitted by logos on Sat, 06/29/2013 - 08:09
paper title: 

LIES AND DECEPTION: A FAILED RECONCILIATION (pages 227–230)

paper type: 
debate
paper author: 

Fernando BRONCANO-BERROCAL

paper author family name: 

BRONCANO-BERROCAL

paper abstract: 

ABSTRACT: The traditional view of lying says that lying is a matter of intending to deceive others by making statements that one believes to be false. Jennifer Lackey has recently defended the following version of the traditional view: A lies to B just in case (i) A states that p to B, (ii) A believes that p is false and (iii) A intends to be deceptive to B in stating that p. I argue that, despite all the virtues that Lackey ascribes to her view, conditions (i), (ii) and (iii) are not sufficient for lying.

paper pdf: 
paper issue: 
12

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