conditional proof

ANOTHER BLOW TO KNOWLEDGE FROM KNOWLEDGE (pages 311–317)

Submitted by logos on Thu, 09/26/2013 - 17:22
paper title: 

ANOTHER BLOW TO KNOWLEDGE FROM KNOWLEDGE (pages 311–317)

paper type: 
article
paper author: 

Peter MURPHY

paper author family name: 

MURPHY

paper abstract: 

ABSTRACT: A novel argument is offered against the following popular condition on inferential knowledge: a person inferentially knows a conclusion only if they know each of the claims from which they essentially inferred that conclusion. The epistemology of conditional proof reveals that we sometimes come to know conditionals by inferring them from assumptions rather than beliefs. Since knowledge requires belief, cases of knowing via conditional proof refute the popular knowledge from knowledge condition. It also suggests more radical cases against the condition and it brings to light the under-recognized category of inferential basic knowledge. 

paper issue: 
13

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