concepts

CONCEPTS, INTUITIONS AND EPISTEMIC NORMS (pages 269-285)

Submitted by logos on Mon, 12/27/2010 - 22:39
paper title: 

CONCEPTS, INTUITIONS AND EPISTEMIC NORMS (pages 269-285)

paper type: 
article
paper author: 

Murray CLARKE

paper author family name: 

Clarke

paper abstract: 

ABSTRACT: In this paper, I argue that Dual Process Theories of cognition, as recently defended by Keith Frankish and Jonathan Evans, Keith Stanovich, Peter Carruthers, Richard Samuels, and others, offer a useful framework that can transform our conception of the nature and role of concepts in cognitive science and the role of intuitions in epistemology. The result is that recent debates concerning competing accounts of concepts, the role of intuition in epistemology, and debates between internalists and externalists concerning the nature of epistemic justification and knowledge, can be usefully advanced given the resources of such Dual Process Theories.

paper issue: 
2

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