externalism

EXTERNALISM, SKEPTICISM, AND BELIEF (pages 275-301)

Submitted by logos on Tue, 09/30/2014 - 07:34
paper title: 

EXTERNALISM, SKEPTICISM, AND BELIEF (pages 275-301)

paper type: 
article
paper author: 

Michael Shaw PERRY

paper author family name: 

PERRY

paper abstract: 

ABSTRACT: In this paper I analyze epistemological externalism and its adequacy as a response to skepticism. Externalism is defined by denial of accessibility: a subject can know if a particular condition beyond truth and belief is satisfied, even if the subject has no reflective access to the satisfaction of the condition. It hence has quick responses to skepticism. Three sorts of skepticism are differentiated and discussed: high standards skepticism, Cartesian-style skepticism, and Pyrrhonism. If we decouple high standards and Cartesian-style skepticism, a simple fallibilism is a superior response to the first and externalism is an unsatisfying response to the second. Pyrrhonism reveals what it is missing in externalism. Pyrrhonism targets belief and so redefinitions of knowledge are insufficient as a reply. Externalism assumes we have beliefs and asks what must be added to achieve knowledge, but if we look at the epistemic situation the externalist puts us in, it is not clear we would form or retain beliefs. In similar circumstances the Pyrrhonist suspends judgment. Once we are clear how Pyrrhonism actually challenges externalism it provides a direct and more revealing critique, making clear what is given up and pointing the way for further epistemological inquiry.      

paper issue: 
17
paper title: 

EXPLICATING A STANDARD EXTERNALIST ARGUMENT AGAINST THE KK PRINCIPLE (pages 399–406)

paper type: 
article
paper author: 

Simon D'ALFONSO

paper author family name: 

D'ALFONSO

paper abstract: 

ABSTRACT: The KK principle is typically rejected in externalist accounts of knowledge. However, a standard general argument for this rejection is in need of a supportive explication. In a recent paper, Samir Okasha argues that the standard externalist argument in question is fallacious. In this paper I start off with some critical discussion of Okasha’s analysis before suggesting an alternative way in which an externalist might successfully present such a case. I then further explore this issue via a look at how Fred Dretske’s externalist epistemology, one of the exemplifying accounts, can explain failure of the KK principle. 

paper issue: 
14

RETHINKING THE A PRIORI/A POSTERIORI DISTINCTION (pages 261-277)

Submitted by logos on Wed, 06/27/2012 - 14:58
paper title: 

RETHINKING THE A PRIORI/A POSTERIORI DISTINCTION (pages 261-277)

paper type: 
article
paper author: 

Jennifer Wilson MULNIX

paper author family name: 

MULNIX

paper abstract: 

ABSTRACT: This paper offers an account of the a priori/a posteriori distinction utilizing the insights of reliabilism, focusing on the inputs to reliable belief-forming processes. I propose that a belief possesses a priori justification if it is the result of a reliable belief-producing process whose input is ‘non-sensory’ and the reliability of this process does not ‘causally depend’ on the reliability of a prior process taking in ‘sensory’ input. One of the interesting consequences of this account is in the treatment of introspective knowledge of one’s belief-states; it was classically considered a posteriori, but comes out a priori on this model. 

paper issue: 
8

CONCEPTS, INTUITIONS AND EPISTEMIC NORMS (pages 269-285)

Submitted by logos on Mon, 12/27/2010 - 22:39
paper title: 

CONCEPTS, INTUITIONS AND EPISTEMIC NORMS (pages 269-285)

paper type: 
article
paper author: 

Murray CLARKE

paper author family name: 

Clarke

paper abstract: 

ABSTRACT: In this paper, I argue that Dual Process Theories of cognition, as recently defended by Keith Frankish and Jonathan Evans, Keith Stanovich, Peter Carruthers, Richard Samuels, and others, offer a useful framework that can transform our conception of the nature and role of concepts in cognitive science and the role of intuitions in epistemology. The result is that recent debates concerning competing accounts of concepts, the role of intuition in epistemology, and debates between internalists and externalists concerning the nature of epistemic justification and knowledge, can be usefully advanced given the resources of such Dual Process Theories.

paper issue: 
2

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