disagreement

paper title: 

PEER DISAGREEMENT AND THE LIMITS OF COHERENT ERROR ATTRIBUTION (pages 179–197)

paper type: 
article
paper author: 

Nicholas TEBBEN

paper author family name: 

TEBBEN

paper abstract: 

ABSTRACT: I argue that, in an important range of cases, judging that one disagrees with an epistemic peer requires attributing, either to one's peer or to oneself, a failure of rationality. There are limits, however, to how much irrationality one can coherently attribute, either to oneself or to another. I argue that these limitations on the coherent attribution of rational error put constraints on permissible responses to peer disagreement. In particular, they provide reason to respond to one-off disagreements with a single peer by maintaining one's beliefs, and they provide reason to moderate one's beliefs when faced with repeated disagreement, or disagreement with multiple peers. Finally, I argue that, though peer disagreement is rare, the occasions on which it does occur tend to be especially important, and the kind of response supported here is correspondingly important. In particular, how leading researchers spend their time and effort depends, in part, on how they respond to peer disagreement. And only a response of the kind supported here strikes the right balance between allowing individual researchers to freely pursue what seems to them to be worthwhile projects, and requiring that they pursue those research projects that the community of experts as a whole believes to be likely to yield significant results.

paper issue: 
12
paper title: 

ON THE NECESSITY OF THE EVIDENTIAL EQUALITY CONDITION FOR EPISTEMIC PEERAGE (pages 113–123)

paper type: 
debate
paper author: 

Michele PALMIRA

paper author family name: 

PALMIRA

paper abstract: 

ABSTRACT: A popular definition of epistemic peerage maintains that two subjects are epistemic peers if and only if they are equals with respect to general epistemic virtues and share the same evidence about the targeted issue. In this paper I shall take up the challenge of defending the necessity of the evidential equality condition for a definition of epistemic peerage from criticisms that can be elicited from the literature on peer disagreement. The paper discusses two definitions that drop this condition and argues that they yield implausible verdicts about the instantiation of the epistemic peerage relation. 

paper issue: 
11
paper title: 

ON EPISTEMIC ABSTEMIOUSNESS AND DIACHRONIC NORMS: A REPLY TO BUNDY (pages 129-134)

paper type: 
debate
paper author: 

Scott AIKIN, Michael HARBOUR, Jonathan NEUFELD, Robert TALISSE

paper author family name: 

AIKIN, HARBOUR, NEUFELD, TALISSE

paper abstract: 

ABSTRACT: In “On Epistemic Abstemiousness,” Alex Bundy has advanced his criticism of our view that the Principle of Suspension yields serious diachronic irrationality. Here, we defend the diachronic perspective on epistemic norms and clarify how we think the diachronic consequences follow. 

paper issue: 
7
paper title: 

ON EPISTEMIC ABSTEMIOUSNESS: A REPLY TO AIKIN, HARBOUR, NEUFELD, AND TALISSE (pages 619-624)

paper type: 
debate
paper author: 

Alex BUNDY

paper author family name: 

BUNDY

paper abstract: 

ABSTRACT: The principle of suspension says that when you disagree with an epistemic peer about p, you should suspend judgment about p. In “Epistemic Abstainers, Epistemic Martyrs, and Epistemic Converts,” Scott F. Aikin, Michael Harbour, Jonathan Neufeld, and Robert B. Talisse argue against the principle of suspension. In “In Defense of Epistemic Abstemiousness” I presented arguments that their arguments do not succeed, and in “On Epistemic Abstemiousness: A Reply to Bundy” they argue that my arguments are not successful. I here clarify and defend my arguments.

paper issue: 
6

WHO IS AN EPISTEMIC PEER? (pages 507-514)

Submitted by logos on Tue, 12/27/2011 - 12:29
paper title: 

WHO IS AN EPISTEMIC PEER? (pages 507-514)

paper type: 
article
paper author: 

Axel GELFERT

paper author family name: 

GELFERT

paper abstract: 

ABSTRACT: Contemporary epistemology of peer disagreement has largely focused on our immediate normative response to prima facie instances of disagreement. Whereas some philosophers demand that we should withhold judgment (or moderate our credences) in such cases, others argue that, unless new evidence becomes available, disagreement at best gives us reason to demote our interlocutor from his peer status. But what makes someone an epistemic peer in the first place? This question has not received the attention it deserves. I begin by surveying different notions of ‘epistemic peer’ that have been peddled in the contemporary literature, arguing that they tend to build normative assumptions about the correct response to disagreement into the notion of peerhood. Instead, I argue, epistemic peerhood needs to be taken seriously in its own right. Importantly, for epistemic agents to count as peers, they should exhibit a comparable degree of reflective awareness of the character and limitations of their own knowledge.

paper issue: 
6

THE CASE FOR RATIONAL UNIQUENESS (pages 359-373)

Submitted by logos on Thu, 09/29/2011 - 11:34
paper title: 

THE CASE FOR RATIONAL UNIQUENESS (pages 359-373)

paper type: 
article
paper author: 

Jonathan MATHESON

paper author family name: 

MATHESON

paper abstract: 

ABSTRACT: The Uniqueness Thesis, or rational uniqueness, claims that a body of evidence severely constrains one’s doxastic options. In particular, it claims that for any body of evidence E and proposition P, E justifies at most one doxastic attitude toward P. In this paper I defend this formulation of the uniqueness thesis and examine the case for its truth. I begin by clarifying my formulation of the Uniqueness Thesis and examining its close relationship to evidentialism. I proceed to give some motivation for this strong epistemic claim and to defend it from several recent objections in the literature. In particular I look at objections to the Uniqueness Thesis coming from considerations of rational disagreement (can’t reasonable people disagree?), the breadth of doxastic attitudes (can’t what is justified by the evidence encompass more than one doxastic attitude?), borderline cases and caution (can’t it be rational to be cautious and suspend judgment even when the evidence slightly supports belief?), vagueness (doesn’t the vagueness of justification spell trouble for the Uniqueness Thesis?), and degrees of belief (doesn’t a finegrained doxastic picture present additional problems for the Uniqueness Thesis?).

paper issue: 
5

IN DEFENSE OF EPISTEMIC ABSTEMIOUSNESS (pages 287-292)

Submitted by logos on Tue, 06/28/2011 - 16:46
paper title: 

IN DEFENSE OF EPISTEMIC ABSTEMIOUSNESS (pages 287-292)

paper type: 
debate
paper author: 

Alex BUNDY

paper author family name: 

BUNDY

paper abstract: 

ABSTRACT: The principle of suspension says that when you disagree with an epistemic peer about p, you should suspend judgment about p. In “Epistemic Abstainers, Epistemic Martyrs, and Epistemic Converts,” Scott F. Aikin, Michael Harbour, Jonathan Neufeld, and Robert B. Talisse argue against the principle of suspension, claiming that it “is deeply at odds with how we view ourselves as cognitive agents.” I argue that their arguments do not succeed.

paper issue: 
4

PEER-HOOD (pages 127-140)

Submitted by logos on Mon, 03/28/2011 - 10:16
paper title: 

PEER-HOOD (pages 127-140)

paper type: 
article
paper author: 

Richard D. VULICH

paper author family name: 

Richard D. VULICH

paper abstract: 

ABSTRACT: When one is involved in a disagreement with another individual it is important to know how much weight to give to the disputant's testimony. I argue that it is not necessary to have background information about the individual with whom one is disagreeing in order for one to rationally regard the disputant as an epistemic peer. I contrast this view with an alternative view according to which it is only rational to regard a disputant as a peer in cases where one has background information to indicate that the disputant is a peer. I show that unless we make some implausible assumptions about the truth-effectiveness of reconsideration, it is better to regard unknown disputants as peers because doing so increases the ratio of true to total beliefs in one's belief set.

paper pdf: 
paper issue: 
3
paper title: 

EPISTEMIC ABSTAINERS, EPISTEMIC MARTYRS, AND EPISTEMIC CONVERTS (pages 211-219)

paper type: 
article
paper author: 

Scott F. AIKIN, Michael HARBOUR, Jonathan NEUFELD, Robert B. TALISSE

paper author family name: 

Aikin

paper abstract: 

ABSTRACT: An intuitive view regarding the epistemic significance of disagreement says that when epistemic peers disagree, they should suspend judgment. This abstemious view seems to embody a kind of detachment appropriate for rational beings; moreover, it seems to promote a kind of conciliatory inclination that makes for irenic and cooperative further discussion. Like many strategies for cooperation, however, the abstemious view creates opportunities for free-riding. In this essay, the authors argue that the believer who suspends judgment in the face of peer disagreement is vulnerable to a kind of manipulation on the part of more tenacious peers. The result is that the abstemious view can have the effect of encouraging dogmatism.

paper issue: 
2

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