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HOW TO UNDERSTAND AND SOLVE THE LOTTERY PARADOX (pages 283–292)

Submitted by logos on Thu, 09/26/2013 - 17:13
paper title: 

HOW TO UNDERSTAND AND SOLVE THE LOTTERY PARADOX (pages 283–292)

paper type: 
article
paper author: 

Patrick BONDY

paper author family name: 

BONDY

paper abstract: 

ABSTRACT: It has been claimed that there is a lottery paradox for justification and an analogous paradox for knowledge, and that these two paradoxes should have a common solution. I argue that there is in fact no lottery paradox for knowledge, since that version of the paradox has a demonstrably false premise. The solution to the justification paradox is to deny closure of justification under conjunction. I present a principle which allows us to deny closure of justification under conjunction in certain kinds of cases, but which still allows that belief in a conjunction on the basis of justified belief in its conjuncts can often be justified. 

paper issue: 
13

EPISTEMIC CLOSURE AND SKEPTICISM (pages 221-246)

Submitted by logos on Mon, 12/27/2010 - 22:50
paper title: 

EPISTEMIC CLOSURE AND SKEPTICISM (pages 221-246)

paper type: 
article
paper author: 

John A. BARKER, Fred ADAMS

paper author family name: 

Barker

paper abstract: 

ABSTRACT: Closure is the epistemological thesis that if S knows that P and knows that P implies Q, then if S infers that Q, S knows that Q. Fred Dretske acknowledges that closure is plausible but contends that it should be rejected because it conflicts with the plausible thesis: Conclusive reasons (CR): S knows that P only if S believes P on the basis of conclusive reasons, i.e., reasons S wouldn’t have if it weren’t the case that P. Dretske develops an analysis of knowing that centers on CR, and argues that the requirement undermines skepticism by implying the falsity of closure. We develop a Dretske-style analysis of knowing that incorporates CR, and we argue that this analysis not only accords with closure, but also implies it. In addition, we argue that the analysis accounts for the prima facie plausibility of closure-invoking skeptical arguments, and nonetheless implies that they are fallacious. If our arguments turn out to be sound, the acceptability of Dretske’s analysis of knowing will be significantly enhanced by the fact that, despite implying closure, it undermines closure-based skepticism.

paper issue: 
2

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