presentism

paper title: 

IN DEFENSE OF THE COMPOSSIBILITY OF PRESENTISM AND TIME TRAVEL (pages 141–159)

paper type: 
article
paper author: 

Thomas HALL

paper author family name: 

HALL

paper abstract: 

ABSTRACT: In this paper I defend the compossibility of presentism and time travel from two objections. One objection is that the presentist’s model of time leaves nowhere to travel to; the second objection attempts to equate presentist time travel with suicide. After targeting some misplaced scrutiny of the first objection, I show that presentists have the resources to account for the facts that make for time travel on the traditional Lewisian view. In light of this ability, I argue that both of the objections fail. 

paper issue: 
16
paper title: 

DISSECTING THE SUICIDE MACHINE ARGUMENT: INSIGHTS FROM THE HALES –LICON DEBATE (pages 339–352)

paper type: 
debate
paper author: 

Jimmy Alfonso LICON

paper author family name: 

LICON

paper abstract: 

ABSTRACT: I assess the debate over the Suicide Machine Argument. There are several lessons to be learned from this debate. First, there is a fruitful distinction to be made, between tensed and tenseless versions of presentism, despite the temptation to suppose that presentism is a tensed theory of time. Second, once we’ve made the distinction between different kinds of presentism, it is clear that Licon’s objection protects the tenseless version of presentism from the Suicide Machine Argument; however, the argument is still effective against the tensed version. Finally, I argue that if the presentist wants to remain a card carrying presentist, in the face of the challenge posed by Hales, then she must abandon her commitment to tense. 

paper issue: 
13
paper title: 

STILL NO SUICIDE FOR PRESENTISTS: WHY HALES’ RESPONSE FAILS (pages 149-155)

paper type: 
debate
paper author: 

Jimmy Alfonso LICON

paper author family name: 

LICON

paper abstract: 

ABSTRACT: In this paper, I defend my original objection to Hales’ suicide machine argument against Hales’ response. I argue Hales’ criticisms are either misplaced or underestimate the strength of my objection; if the constraints of the original objection are respected, my original objection blocks Hales’ reply. To be thorough, I restate an improved version of the objection to the suicide machine argument. I conclude that Hales fails to motivate a reasonable worry as to the supposed suicidal nature of presentist time travel. 

paper issue: 
7

REPLY TO LICON ON TIME TRAVEL (pages 633-636)

Submitted by logos on Tue, 12/27/2011 - 12:51
paper title: 

REPLY TO LICON ON TIME TRAVEL (pages 633-636)

paper type: 
debate
paper author: 

Steven D. HALES

paper author family name: 

HALES

paper abstract: 

ABSTRACT: In this paper I offer a rejoinder to the criticisms raised by Jimmy Alfonso Licon in “No Suicide for Presentists: A Response to Hales.” I argue that Licon's concerns are misplaced, and that his hypothetical presentist time machine neither travels in time nor saves the life of the putative traveler. I conclude that sensible time travel is still forbidden to presentists.

paper issue: 
6

NO SUICIDE FOR PRESENTISTS: A RESPONSE TO HALES (pages 455-464)

Submitted by logos on Thu, 09/29/2011 - 11:42
paper title: 

NO SUICIDE FOR PRESENTISTS: A RESPONSE TO HALES (pages 455-464)

paper type: 
debate
paper author: 

Jimmy Alfonso LICON

paper author family name: 

LICON

paper abstract: 

ABSTRACT: Steven Hales constructs a novel argument against the possibility of presentist time travel called the suicide machine argument. Hales argues that if presentism were true, then time travel would result in the annihilation of the time traveler. But such a consequence is not time travel, therefore presentism cannot allow for the possibility of time travel. This paper argues that in order for the suicide machine argument to succeed, it must make (at least) one of two assumptions, each of which beg the question. The argument must either assume that the sequence of moments is invariant, or that time travel through time requires distinct, co-instantiated moments. Because the former disjunct assumes that presentist time travel is impossible and the latter assumes that presentism is impossible, the suicide machine argument fails.

paper issue: 
5

NO TIME TRAVEL FOR PRESENTISTS (pages 353-360)

Submitted by logos on Mon, 12/27/2010 - 22:58
paper title: 

NO TIME TRAVEL FOR PRESENTISTS (pages 353-360)

paper type: 
article
paper author: 

Steven D. HALES

paper author family name: 

Hales

paper abstract: 

ABSTRACT: In the present paper, I offer a new argument to show that presentism about time is incompatible with time travel. Time travel requires leaving the present, which, under presentism, contains all of reality. Therefore to leave the present moment is to leave reality entirely; i.e. to go out of existence. Presentist “time travel” is therefore best seen as a form of suicide, not as a mode of transportation. Eternalists about time do not face the same difficulty, and time travel is compossible with eternalism.

paper issue: 
2

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