self-evidence

SELF-EVIDENCE (pages 325-352)

Submitted by logos on Mon, 12/27/2010 - 23:03
paper title: 

SELF-EVIDENCE (pages 325-352)

paper type: 
article
paper author: 

Carl GINET

paper author family name: 

Ginet

paper abstract: 

ABSTRACT: This paper develops an account of what it is for a proposition to be selfevident to someone, based on the idea that certain propositions are such that to fully understand them is to believe them. It argues that when a proposition p is self-evident to one, one has non-inferential a priori justification for believing that p and, a welcome feature, a justification that does not involve exercising any special sort of intuitive faculty; if, in addition, it is true that p and there exists no reason to believe that the proposition that p is incoherent, then one knows a priori that p. The paper argues that certain deeply contingent truths, e.g., the truth that I would now express by saying “I exist”, can be self-evident to, and thus known a priori by, the person they are about at the time they are about; but, since they cannot be known a priori, or even expressed, by anyone else or at any other time, they should not count as a priori truths.

paper pdf: 
paper issue: 
2

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