justification

paper title: 

PHENOMENAL CONSERVATISM AND SELF-DEFEAT ARGUMENTS: A REPLY TO HUEMER (pages 343-350)

paper type: 
debate
paper author: 

Moti MIZRAHI

paper author family name: 

Moti MIZRAHI

paper abstract: 

ABSTRACT: In this paper, I respond to Michael Huemer’s reply to my objection against Phenomenal Conservatism (PC). I have argued that Huemer’s Self-defeat Argument for PC does not favor PC over competing theories of basic propositional justification, since analogous self-defeat arguments can be constructed for competing theories. Huemer responds that such analogous self-defeat arguments are unsound. In this paper, I argue that Huemer’s reply does not save his Self-defeat Argument for PC from my original objection.

paper issue: 
17

EPISTEMIC DEONTOLOGISM AND ROLE-OUGHTS (pages 245-263)

Submitted by logos on Tue, 09/30/2014 - 07:31
paper title: 

EPISTEMIC DEONTOLOGISM AND ROLE-OUGHTS (pages 245-263)

paper type: 
article
paper author: 

Jon ALTSCHUL

paper author family name: 

ALTSCHUL

paper abstract: 

ABSTRACT: William Alston’s argument against epistemological deontologism rests upon two key premises: first, that we lack a suitable amount of voluntary control with respect to our beliefs, and, second, the principle that “ought” implies “can.” While several responses to Alston have concerned rejecting either of these two premises, I argue that even on the assumption that both premises are true, there is room to be made for deontologism in epistemology. I begin by offering a criticism of Richard Feldman’s invaluable work on ‘role-oughts,’ whereupon I develop my own positive view in light of Feldman’s shortcomings. The upshot is that while we as epistemic agents are not responsible for the beliefs we form, we are nonetheless responsible for the various bodily or mental activities that typically bear a causal influence on belief formation.

paper issue: 
17
paper title: 

PHENOMENAL CONSERVATISM, JUSTIFICATION, AND SELF-DEFEAT (pages 103–110)

paper type: 
debate
paper author: 

Moti MIZRAHI

paper author family name: 

MIZRAHI

paper abstract: 

ABSTRACT: In this paper, I argue that Phenomenal Conservatism (PC) is not superior to alternative theories of basic propositional justification insofar as those theories that reject PC are self-defeating. I show that self-defeat arguments similar to Michael Huemer’s Self-Defeat Argument for PC can be constructed for other theories of basic propositional justification as well. If this is correct, then there is nothing special about PC in that respect. In other words, if self-defeat arguments can be advanced in support of alternatives to PC, then Huemer’s Self-Defeat argument doesn’t uniquely motivate PC. 

paper issue: 
15

EPISTEMIC INTERNALISM, JUSTIFICATION, AND MEMORY (pages 33–62)

Submitted by logos on Mon, 03/31/2014 - 17:16
paper title: 

EPISTEMIC INTERNALISM, JUSTIFICATION, AND MEMORY (pages 33–62)

paper type: 
article
paper author: 

B.J.C. Madison

paper author family name: 

Madison

paper abstract: 

ABSTRACT: Epistemic internalism, by stressing the indispensability of the subject’s perspective, strikes many as plausible at first blush. However, many people have tended to reject the position because certain kinds of beliefs have been thought to pose special problems for epistemic internalism. For example, internalists tend to hold that so long as a justifier is available to the subject either immediately or upon introspection, it can serve to justify beliefs. Many have thought it obvious that no such view can be correct, as it has been alleged that internalism cannot account for the possibility of the justification of beliefs stored in memory. My aim in this paper is to offer a response that explains how memory justification is possible in a way that is consistent with epistemic internalism and an awareness condition on justification. Specifically, I will explore the plausibility of various options open to internalists, including both foundationalist and non-foundationalist approaches to the structure of justification. I intend to show that despite other difficult challenges that epistemic internalism might face, memory belief poses no special problems that the resources of internalism cannot adequately address. 

paper issue: 
15

HOW TO UNDERSTAND AND SOLVE THE LOTTERY PARADOX (pages 283–292)

Submitted by logos on Thu, 09/26/2013 - 17:13
paper title: 

HOW TO UNDERSTAND AND SOLVE THE LOTTERY PARADOX (pages 283–292)

paper type: 
article
paper author: 

Patrick BONDY

paper author family name: 

BONDY

paper abstract: 

ABSTRACT: It has been claimed that there is a lottery paradox for justification and an analogous paradox for knowledge, and that these two paradoxes should have a common solution. I argue that there is in fact no lottery paradox for knowledge, since that version of the paradox has a demonstrably false premise. The solution to the justification paradox is to deny closure of justification under conjunction. I present a principle which allows us to deny closure of justification under conjunction in certain kinds of cases, but which still allows that belief in a conjunction on the basis of justified belief in its conjuncts can often be justified. 

paper issue: 
13

DON’T KNOW, DON’T BELIEVE: REPLY TO KROEDEL (pages 231–238)

Submitted by logos on Sat, 06/29/2013 - 08:11
paper title: 

DON’T KNOW, DON’T BELIEVE: REPLY TO KROEDEL (pages 231–238)

paper type: 
debate
paper author: 

Clayton LITTLEJOHN

paper author family name: 

LITTLEJOHN

paper abstract: 

ABSTRACT: In recent work, Thomas Kroedel has proposed a novel solution to the lottery paradox. As he sees it, we are permitted/justified in believing some lottery propositions, but we are not permitted/justified in believing them all. I criticize this proposal on two fronts. First, I think that if we had the right to add some lottery beliefs to our belief set, we would not have any decisive reason to stop adding more. Suggestions to the contrary run into the wrong kind of reason problem. Reflection on the preface paradox suggests as much. Second, while I agree with Kroedel that permissions do not agglomerate, I do not think that this fact can help us solve the lottery paradox. First, I do not think we have any good reason to think that we’re permitted to believe any lottery propositions. Second, I do not see any good reason to think that epistemic permissions do not agglomerate.

paper issue: 
12
paper title: 

THE PERMISSIBILITY SOLUTION TO THE LOTTERY PARADOX – REPLY TO LITTLEJOHN (pages 103–111)

paper type: 
debate
paper author: 

Thomas KROEDEL

paper author family name: 

KROEDEL

paper abstract: 

ABSTRACT: According to the permissibility solution to the lottery paradox, the paradox can be solved if we conceive of epistemic justification as a species of permissibility. Clayton Littlejohn has objected that the permissibility solution draws on a sufficient condition for permissible belief that has implausible consequences and that the solution conflicts with our lack of knowledge that a given lottery ticket will lose. The paper defends the permissibility solution against Littlejohn’s objections. 

paper issue: 
11
paper title: 

JUSTIFIED BELIEVING IS TRACKING YOUR EVIDENTIAL COMMITMENTS (pages 545-564)

paper type: 
article
paper author: 

Barry LAM

paper author family name: 

LAM

paper abstract: 

ABSTRACT: In this paper, I give an account of the conditions for rationally changing your beliefs that respects three constraints; 1) that rational believing is a matter of respecting your evidence, 2) that evidence seems to have both objective and subjective features, and (3) that our set of beliefs seem to rationally commit us to certain propositions, regardless of the evidential support we have for these propositions. On the view I outline, rationally believing or giving up a belief is a matter of your inferences tracking your rational commitments, and that these rational commitments account for the evidence you must respect. These rational commitments are subjective in that they are relative to the totality of your beliefs, but also objective in the sense that what counts as a commitment is true for everyone everywhere. 

paper issue: 
10

LOTTERIES, PROBABILITIES, AND PERMISSIONS (pages 509-514)

Submitted by logos on Sun, 09/30/2012 - 08:42
paper title: 

LOTTERIES, PROBABILITIES, AND PERMISSIONS (pages 509-514)

paper type: 
debate
paper author: 

Clayton LITTLEJOHN

paper author family name: 

LITTLEJOHN

paper abstract: 

ABSTRACT: Thomas Kroedel argues that we can solve a version of the lottery paradox if we identify justified beliefs with permissible beliefs. Since permissions do not agglomerate, we might grant that someone could justifiably believe any ticket in a large and fair lottery is a loser without being permitted to believe that all the tickets will lose. I shall argue that Kroedel’s solution fails. While permissions do not agglomerate, we would have too many permissions if we characterized justified belief as sufficiently probable belief. If we reject the idea that justified beliefs can be characterized as sufficiently probably beliefs, Kroedel’s solution is otiose because the paradox can be dissolved at the outset.

paper issue: 
9

THE CASE FOR RATIONAL UNIQUENESS (pages 359-373)

Submitted by logos on Thu, 09/29/2011 - 11:34
paper title: 

THE CASE FOR RATIONAL UNIQUENESS (pages 359-373)

paper type: 
article
paper author: 

Jonathan MATHESON

paper author family name: 

MATHESON

paper abstract: 

ABSTRACT: The Uniqueness Thesis, or rational uniqueness, claims that a body of evidence severely constrains one’s doxastic options. In particular, it claims that for any body of evidence E and proposition P, E justifies at most one doxastic attitude toward P. In this paper I defend this formulation of the uniqueness thesis and examine the case for its truth. I begin by clarifying my formulation of the Uniqueness Thesis and examining its close relationship to evidentialism. I proceed to give some motivation for this strong epistemic claim and to defend it from several recent objections in the literature. In particular I look at objections to the Uniqueness Thesis coming from considerations of rational disagreement (can’t reasonable people disagree?), the breadth of doxastic attitudes (can’t what is justified by the evidence encompass more than one doxastic attitude?), borderline cases and caution (can’t it be rational to be cautious and suspend judgment even when the evidence slightly supports belief?), vagueness (doesn’t the vagueness of justification spell trouble for the Uniqueness Thesis?), and degrees of belief (doesn’t a finegrained doxastic picture present additional problems for the Uniqueness Thesis?).

paper issue: 
5

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