belief

AN ARGUMENT AGAINST THE POSSIBILITY OF GETTIERED BELIEFS (pages 265-272)

Submitted by logos on Tue, 09/30/2014 - 07:32
paper title: 

AN ARGUMENT AGAINST THE POSSIBILITY OF GETTIERED BELIEFS (pages 265-272)

paper type: 
article
paper author: 

Benoit GAULTIER

paper author family name: 

GAULTIER

paper abstract: 

ABSTRACT: In this paper, I propose a new argument against Gettier’s counterexamples to the thesis that knowledge is justified true belief. I claim that if there is no doxastic voluntarism, and if it is admitted that one has formed the belief that p at t1 if, at t0, one would be surprised to learn or discover that not-p, it can be plausibly argued that Gettiered beliefs simply cannot be formed.

paper issue: 
17

RECOVERING PLATO: A PLATONIC VIRTUE EPISTEMOLOGY (pages 7–31)

Submitted by logos on Mon, 03/31/2014 - 17:14
paper title: 

RECOVERING PLATO: A PLATONIC VIRTUE EPISTEMOLOGY (pages 7–31)

paper type: 
article
paper author: 

James FILLER

paper author family name: 

FILLER

paper abstract: 

ABSTRACT: Recently, there has been a move in contemporary epistemological philosophy toward a virtue epistemology, which sees certain character traits of the rational agent as critical in the acquisition of knowledge. This attempt to introduce virtue into epistemological investigations has, however, relied almost exclusively on an Aristotelian account of virtue. In this paper, I attempt to take a new tack and examine a virtue epistemological account grounded in Platonic thought. Taking seriously the distinction between knowledge and opinion found in the Republic, I then draw upon two virtues, humility and what I call sincerity, to flesh out this account. 

paper issue: 
15
paper title: 

BELIEF IN NATURALISM: AN EPISTEMOLOGIST’S PHILOSOPHY OF MIND (pages 67-84)

paper type: 
article
paper author: 

Susan HAACK

paper author family name: 

HAACK

paper abstract: 

ABSTRACT: My title, “Belief in Naturalism,” signals, not that I adopt naturalism as an article of faith, but that my purpose in this paper is to shed some light on what belief is, on why the concept of belief is needed in epistemology, and how all this relates to debates about epistemological naturalism. After clarifying the many varieties of naturalism, philosophical and other (section 1), and then the various forms of epistemological naturalism specifically (section 2), I offer a theory of belief in which three elements – the behavioral, the neurophysiological, and the socio-historical – interlock (section 3), and apply this theory to resolve some contested questions: about whether animals and pre-linguistic infants have beliefs, about the fallibility of introspection, and about self-deception (section 4).

paper issue: 
1

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