reductionism

paper title: 

INTERNALIST EVIDENTIALISM AND EPISTEMIC VIRTUE: RE-REPLY TO AXTELL (pages 281-289)

paper type: 
debate
paper author: 

Trent DOUGHERTY

paper author family name: 

DOUGHERTY

paper abstract: 

ABSTRACT: In this brief re-reply to Axtell, I reply to key criticisms of my previous reply and flesh out a bit my notions of the relationship between internalist evidentialism and epistemic virtue and epistemic value. 

paper issue: 
8

RE-REDUCING RESPONSIBILITY: REPLY TO AXTELL (pages 625-632)

Submitted by logos on Tue, 12/27/2011 - 12:49
paper title: 

RE-REDUCING RESPONSIBILITY: REPLY TO AXTELL (pages 625-632)

paper type: 
debate
paper author: 

Trent DOUGHERTY

paper author family name: 

DOUGHERTY

paper abstract: 

ABSTRACT: In this brief reply to Axtell, I review some general considerations pertaining to the disagreement and then reply point-by-point to Axtell's critique of the dilemma I pose for responsibilists in virtue epistemology. Thus I re-affirm my reductionist identity thesis that every case of epistemic irresponsibility is either a case of ordinary moral irresponsibility or ordinary practical irrationality.

paper issue: 
6

PEER-HOOD (pages 127-140)

Submitted by logos on Mon, 03/28/2011 - 10:16
paper title: 

PEER-HOOD (pages 127-140)

paper type: 
article
paper author: 

Richard D. VULICH

paper author family name: 

Richard D. VULICH

paper abstract: 

ABSTRACT: When one is involved in a disagreement with another individual it is important to know how much weight to give to the disputant's testimony. I argue that it is not necessary to have background information about the individual with whom one is disagreeing in order for one to rationally regard the disputant as an epistemic peer. I contrast this view with an alternative view according to which it is only rational to regard a disputant as a peer in cases where one has background information to indicate that the disputant is a peer. I show that unless we make some implausible assumptions about the truth-effectiveness of reconsideration, it is better to regard unknown disputants as peers because doing so increases the ratio of true to total beliefs in one's belief set.

paper pdf: 
paper issue: 
3
paper title: 

BELIEF IN NATURALISM: AN EPISTEMOLOGIST’S PHILOSOPHY OF MIND (pages 67-84)

paper type: 
article
paper author: 

Susan HAACK

paper author family name: 

HAACK

paper abstract: 

ABSTRACT: My title, “Belief in Naturalism,” signals, not that I adopt naturalism as an article of faith, but that my purpose in this paper is to shed some light on what belief is, on why the concept of belief is needed in epistemology, and how all this relates to debates about epistemological naturalism. After clarifying the many varieties of naturalism, philosophical and other (section 1), and then the various forms of epistemological naturalism specifically (section 2), I offer a theory of belief in which three elements – the behavioral, the neurophysiological, and the socio-historical – interlock (section 3), and apply this theory to resolve some contested questions: about whether animals and pre-linguistic infants have beliefs, about the fallibility of introspection, and about self-deception (section 4).

paper issue: 
1

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