Volume IV, Issue 4, 2013
FROM HISTORICAL CHANGE TO HISTORICAL KNOWLEDGE: DIRECTIONS OF A NEW EPISTEMOLOGY OF THE HUMAN SCIENCES (pages 381–397)
ABSTRACT: The present paper endeavors to trace the sketch of a possible epistemology of the human sciences. In this sense it begins with the determination of the object of knowledge in the human sciences through a careful examination of the reality of history and of the human world. Then, considering the peculiarity of the domain of the human sciences the paper proceeds to show that their object of knowledge is best understood as “event” in the sense of Gilles Deleuze and Alain Badiou. And, in the end, it circumscribes two modes of knowledge of this object of the human sciences understood as event.
EXPLICATING A STANDARD EXTERNALIST ARGUMENT AGAINST THE KK PRINCIPLE (pages 399–406)
ABSTRACT: The KK principle is typically rejected in externalist accounts of knowledge. However, a standard general argument for this rejection is in need of a supportive explication. In a recent paper, Samir Okasha argues that the standard externalist argument in question is fallacious. In this paper I start off with some critical discussion of Okasha’s analysis before suggesting an alternative way in which an externalist might successfully present such a case. I then further explore this issue via a look at how Fred Dretske’s externalist epistemology, one of the exemplifying accounts, can explain failure of the KK principle.
MISFIRED SLINGSHOTS: A CASE STUDY ON THE CONFUSION OF METAPHYSICAL AND SEMANTIC CONSIDERATIONS (pages 407–432)
ABSTRACT: Most philosophers today will acknowledge the pitfalls of confusing metaphysical and semantic issues. Many are also familiar with the classic semi-formal argument that has come to be known as ‘the Slingshot’ and the various philosophical ends to which this argument has been deployed. The combination of the argument’s relatively simple theoretical machinery and its wide range of applications make it ripe for abuse. The slingshot was originally conceived as a semantic argument about designation; what it suggests, but does not prove, is that the closest analogue to singular term reference for any expression is that expression’s semantic extension. In order to derive more metaphysically robust conclusions, however, many classical deployments of the argument make use of several methodologically suspicious tactics. By cataloguing the more frequent abuses of the argument, we may remind ourselves of a valuable philosophical lesson.
SELF: A DYNAMIC APPROACH (pages 433–448)
ABSTRACT:According to the classical approach, the self was regarded as a pure unchanging spiritual entity, with a cognitive content which is the consequence of self-awareness that characterises human being. Against this classical conception, the convergence approaches of phenomenology, developmental psychology or neuroscience highlighted the fact that the self is the result of the ongoing dynamics of experiences we have as embodied agents, e.g. the dynamic coupling between the embodied agent and the world, the dynamics of the primal emotions and feelings, as well as the dynamics of neural processes. Hence, the self appears as an embodied self, embedded in a certain context having a pre-reflective character, resulting from the direct coupling of the person with the natural or social environment. In conclusion, according to the contemporary approaches, the self is a multifaceted phenomenon, which should be understood from the perspective of the various dynamic relationships mediated among body, brain, and environment.
WHY EPISTEMIC PERMISSIONS DON’T AGGLOMERATE – ANOTHER REPLY TO LITTLEJOHN (pages 451–455)
ABSTRACT: Clayton Littlejohn claims that the permissibility solution to the lottery paradox requires an implausible principle in order to explain why epistemic permissions don’t agglomerate. This paper argues that an uncontentious principle suffices to explain this. It also discusses another objection of Littlejohn’s, according to which we’re not permitted to believe lottery propositions because we know that we’re not in a position to know them.
WHY ASSERTION AND PRACTICAL REASONING ARE POSSIBLY NOT GOVERNED BY THE SAME EPISTEMIC NORM (pages 457–464)
ABSTRACT: This paper focuses on Martin Montminy’s recent attempt to show that assertion and practical reasoning are necessarily governed by the same epistemic norm (“Why Assertion and Practical Reasoning Must be Governed By the Same Epistemic Norm,” Pacific Philosophical Quarterly, 2013). I show that the attempt fails. I finish by considering the upshot for the recent debate concerning the connection between the epistemic norms of assertion and practical reasoning.
David Christensen and Jennifer Lackey, eds., The Epistemology of Disagreement: New Essays (pages 467–468)
Philippe Huneman, ed., Functions: Selection and Mechanism (pages 469–474)
Stephen Hetherington, ed., Epistemology: The Key Thinkers (pages 475–477)